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Is UNJusT-Perini Corp. v. Greate Bay Hotel & Casino, Inc., 129
N.J. 479, 610 A.2d 364 (1992).
Arbitration 1 is one of several fora available to parties for the
resolution of their disputes.2 As an expeditious, inexpensive, and
I In Perini Corp. v. Greate Bay Hotel & Casino, Inc., the New Jersey Supreme Court
defined arbitration as a system in which the parties agree to submit their dispute to an
arbitrator of their own choosing while also agreeing to be bound by the award rendered. Perini Corp. v. Greate Bay Hotel & Casino, Inc., 129 N.J. 479, 490, 610 A.2d
364, 369 (1992) (citation omitted). The Perinicourt also noted that arbitration was "a
substitution, by consent of the parties, of another tribunal for the tribunal provided
by the ordinary processes of law" and "[a] n arrangement for taking and abiding by the
judgment of selected persons in some disputed matter, instead of carrying it to established tribunals of justice, and is intended to avoid the formalities, the delay, the
expense and vexation of ordinary litigation." Id. (citation omitted); see also BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 105 (6th ed. 1990) (defining arbitration as "[a] process of dispute

resolution in which a neutral third party (arbitrator) renders a decision after a hearing at which both parties have an opportunity to be heard"). For a more detailed
definition of arbitration, see 2 RuLING CASE LAw, Arbitration § 2 (1929) (defining arbitration and distinguishing it from appraisement, a method of preventing future disputes through contractual stipulations) (footnotes omitted); Sylvan Gotshal, The Art of
Arbitration, 48 A.B.A. J. 533, 553 (1962) (noting that arbitration is "a simple, uncomplicated system, created through need by trial and error, whereby mankind has settled
and does settle disputes of every kind or nature through the acceptance of the judgment of one or more reasonable and competent honorable men as the final settlement of the dispute"). For a general discussion of the contractual nature of
arbitration, see MARTIN DOMKE, DOMKE ON COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION § 1.01, at 1-4
(rev. ed. 1984).
2 ThomasJ. Stipanowich, Punitive Damages in ArbitrationGarrity v. Lyle Stuart, Inc.
Reconsidered, 66 B.U. L. Rev. 953, 953 (1986). Other forms of alternative dispute resolution include mediation, summary jury trials, expert fact-finding, mini-trials and early
neutral evaluation. Lucy V. Katz, Compulsory Alternative Dispute Resolution and Voluntarism: Two-Headed Monster or Two Sides of the Coin?, 1 J. Disp. RESOL. 1, 1 (1993). Commercial arbitration has many advantages, including reduction of court congestion,
expedition of proceedings, minimization of costs, and preservation of business relationships. Christa Arcos, Comment, 24 SuFFoLK U. L. Ruv. 189, 193 (1990). But see
Richard S. Bayer & Harlan S. Abrahams, The Trouble with Arbitration, LrnG. J., Winter
1985, at 30, 31-32 (discussing some of the disadvantages involved in choosing arbitration over litigation, among them, forced informality and difficulties involved in overturning a bad award). For a presentation of articles that explore different aspects of
arbitration, see generally Symposium, Achieving Justice in Arbitration, 65 TUL. L. REv.
1303 (1991). See also AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, PIONEERS IN DISPUTE RESOLUTION A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION ON rrs 65TH ANNIVER-

(1926-1991) 4-6 (1991) (describing the history of arbitration in America,
including the development of the American Arbitration Association).
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informal disposition of claims,- arbitration has become a favored
3 See Perini, 129 N.J. at 490, 610 A.2d at 369 (stating that arbitration is known for
its speedy, cost-efficient, informal method of resolution, as well as its finality) (quoting Barcon Assocs. v. Tri-County Asphalt Corp., 86 N.J. 179, 187, 430 A.2d 214, 217-18
(1981) (further quotation omitted)). Over the years, New Jersey courts have recognized the same advantages of arbitration for the disputing parties. In re Arbitration
Between Grover, 80 N.J. 221, 234, 403 A.2d 448, 454-55 (1979) (Pashman, J., dissenting) (citations omitted); Carpenter v. Bloomer, 54 N.J. Super. 157, 162, 148 A.2d 497,
500 (App. Div. 1959) (citations omitted); Harsen v. Board of Educ., 132 N.J. Super.
365, 370, 333 A.2d 580, 583 (Law Div. 1975); Hoboken Mfrs. R.R. v. Hoboken R.R.
Warehouse & Steamship Connecting, 132 N.J. Eq. 111, 118, 27 A.2d 150, 154 (Ch.
1942), aft'd, 133 N.J. Eq. 270, 31 A.2d 801 (1943); Eastern Eng'g Co. v. Ocean City, 11
N.J. Misc. 508, 510-11, 167 A. 522, 523 (1933); Leslie v. Leslie, 50 N.J. Eq. 103, 108, 24
A. 319, 321 (Ch. 1892); see also Hazen v. Addis, 14 N.J.L. 333, 337 (1834) (noting that
the principal object of arbitration is to avoid future litigation).
In Local No. 153, Office and ProfessionalEmployees International Union v. Trust Co.,
the New Jersey Supreme Court mentioned that arbitration was a way of privately
resolving disputes between parties in a flexible manner. Local No. 153, Office of
Professional Employees Int'l Union v. Trust Co., 105 N.J. 442, 448, 522 A.2d 992, 99495 (1987) (citation omitted). New Jersey courts have also recognized arbitration's
value in allowing parties to avoid the courts. Faherty v. Faherty, 97 N.J. 99, 105, 477
A.2d 1257, 1261 (1984); Elberon Bathing Co. v. Ambassador Ins. Co., 77 N.J. 1, 16-17,
389 A.2d 439, 446 (1978); see also Local Union 560, I.B.T. v. Eazor Express, Inc., 95
N.J. Super. 219, 227, 230 A.2d 521, 525 (App. Div. 1967) (noting specifically that the
purpose of labor law arbitration was to minimize industrial strife) (citation omitted).
Other courts have pronounced various reasons for resorting to arbitration. See,
e.g., Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 439-40 (1953) (observing that the considerations of
speed, flexibility, informality, and finality led to the enactment of the Federal Arbitration Act) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting), overruled by Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/
American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 484 (1989); Diapulse Corp. of Am. v. Carba, 626
F.2d 1108, 1110 (2d Cir. 1980) (stating that arbitration avoids expensive and prolonged court proceedings) (citation omitted); Exxon Shipping Co. v. Exxon
Seamen's Union, 788 F. Supp. 829, 834 (D.N.J. 1992) (recognizing the same benefits
as those found in Wi/ho) (quoting Penntech Papers, Inc. v. United Paperworkers Int'l
Union, 896 F.2d 51, 53 (3d Cir. 1990)), afftd, 993 F.2d 357 (3d Cir. 1993); Arkansas
Dep't of Parks & Tourism v. Resort Managers, 743 S.W.2d 389, 391 (Ark. 1988) (acknowledging that avoiding litigation was the "main" purpose of arbitration); Gaer
Bros. v. Mott, 130 A.2d 804, 806 (Conn. 1957) (noting that utilization of arbitration
avoids litigation and ensures prompt settlement of disputes); Utah Constr. Co. v.
Western Pacific R.R., 162 P. 631, 632-33 (Cal. 1917) (recognizing that the policy of
arbitration was to avoid delays in civil litigation). But see Detroit Auto. Inter-Ins. Exch.
v. Gavin, 331 N.W.2d 418, 427 (Mich. 1982) (observing that the aspects of expeditiousness, inexpensiveness, and nonreviewability of arbitration proceedings were not
the sole or even primary goals of statutory arbitration). For a general discussion of
the many purposes of arbitration, see Note, JudicialReview of Arbitration on the Merits,
63 HARv. L. REv. 681, 681 (1950) [hereinafter Judicial Review of Arbitration];5 AM. JUR.
2D Arbitration and Award § 1 (1962). See also Bettyann Babjak, Note, 17 SETON HALL L.
Rv. 307, 312-14 (1987) (discussing the benefits of arbitration, specifically in labor
contexts).
From the judiciary's perspective, one important advantage of arbitration is that
the arbitration process eases congested court calendars. Cargill v. Northwestern Nat'l
Ins. Co., 462 A.2d 833, 834 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1983) (citation omitted); see alsoJunius L.
Allison, Problems in the Delivery of Legal Services, 63 A.B.A.J. 518, 519 (1977) (stating that
arbitration provides the means to resolve a dispute at a more cost-efficient rate than
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alternative to litigation.4 Despite an initial reluctance to recognize
the validity of arbitration, 5 courts have come to appreciate arbitradoes the court system); Judge Stanley Sporkin, Foreword to

RALPH C. FERRERA AND
DANNY ERTEL, BEYOND ARBITRATION DESIGNING ALTERNATIVES TO SECURITIES LITIGA-

at xvii (1991) (noting the importance of the country's focus on the litigation
explosion, and pointing out the necessity of providing an arena to resolve disputes on
a virtually cost-free and timely basis). Judge Sporkin later explained that one of the
advantages of arbitration over litigation was arbitration's ability to process a dispute
much more quickly than the courts. Id. Although no NewJersey courts have focused
on this aspect of arbitration, NewJersey is certainly not immune from the problem of
court congestion. See ArthurJ. Simpson,Jr., WhitherJudicialArbitrationin New Jersey 2-3
(Mar. 9, 1982) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the NewJersey State Library and
the Seton Hall Law Review) (providing statistics on the backlog of court cases on the
New Jersey docket through 1977). For a discussion on the need for alleviating court
calendar-loads by arbitration and other means, see id. at 5, n.8 (citing Chief Justice
Warren E. Burger, Annual Address Year-end Report on the Judiciary (1980), reprinted
in Year-End Report on the Judiciary, 107 N.J. L.J. 49 (Jan. 22, 1981); Robert Coulson,
President, American Arbitration Association, Address at Arbitration Day 1980, reprinted in Arbitration Developments: National and InternationalActivities, 107 N.J. L.J. 60
(Jan. 22, 1981) (further citations omitted)).
4 James Hadden, The Authority of Arbitrators to Award Punitive Damages: Raytheon
Co. v. Automated Business Systems, 7 OHIO ST. J. DIse. RES. 337, 337 (1992). For
example, in 1984, almost 40,000 accident, commercial, and labor cases were filed with
the American Arbitration Association (AAA). Stipanowich, supra note 2, at 953 n.2
(citation omitted); see also BERTHOLD H. HOENIGER, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION HMNDBOOK § 1.01, at 1-1 (1st ed. 1990) (noting the progressive increase in arbitration cases
filed with the AAA from 6,140 in 1980 to 12,350 in 1989); Caseload Up, ProcessingTime
Down, ARB.J.,June 1992, at 10 (reflecting the statistic that 62,327 cases were filed with
the AAA in 1991).
The reaction in the federal courts has been particularly positive in favoring arbitration. See, e.g., Mandich v. Watters, 970 F.2d 462, 466 (8th Cir. 1992) (endorsing
arbitration under Minnesota law); Echostar Satellite Corp. v. General Elec. Co., 797 F.
Supp. 855, 857 (D. Colo. 1992) (recognizing that federal policy favors arbitration)
(citation omitted); Victor v. State Farm Fire and Casualty Co., 795 F. Supp. 300, 302
(D. Alaska 1992) (endorsing arbitration under Alaska law) (citations omitted). For a
general discussion of federal arbitration law, see DOMKE, supra note 1, at § 4.03, at 3146.
Many courts have also recognized the value of using arbitration for resolving labor conflicts. Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 379 U.S. 650, 653 (1965) (approving
contract grievance procedures for settling labor disputes); see also LaCourse v. Firemen's Ins. Co., 756 F.2d 10, 12 (3d Cir. 1985) (stating that despite Pennsylvania's
policy of favoring arbitration for commercial disputes, federal policy favoring arbitration of labor disputes was stronger) (citations omitted), affd, 822 F.2d 53 (1987);
Ludwig V. Honold Mfg. Co. v. Fletcher, 405 F.2d 1123, 1128 (3d Cir. 1969) (recognizing arbitration as one method of enforcing the strong public policy of encouraging
peaceful settlement of industrial disputes); Independent Lift Truck Builders Union v.
Hyster Co., 803 F. Supp. 1374, 1375 (C.D. 11. 1992) (reiterating the value of arbitration in labor disputes) (citation omitted); cf Raytheon Co. v. Automated Business
Sys., Inc., 882 F.2d 6, 10 (1st Cir. 1989) (noting that the differences between labor
and commercial arbitration are such that their procedures are not necessarily
interchangeable).
5 Perini,129 N.J. at 489, 610 A.2d at 369 (observing a past hostility to arbitration in
the courts). For a general discussion of the hostility historically exhibited by AmeriTION
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tion's overall importance. 6 In recognition of arbitration's significant role, courts have adopted a policy of great deference to
arbitration and as a result have limited the judiciary's review of
these awards.7
Different jurisdictions have applied varying standards of review in vacating arbitration awards for an arbitrator's mistake of
law. 8 For example, certain courts have held that an award may be
can courts and academia to common law arbitration, see DoMKE, supra note 1, at

§§ 2.04-.06, 3.01, at 16-20, 21-23.
6 Perini, 129 N.J. at 489, 610 A.2d at 369 (citing James B. Boskey, A History of
Commercial Arbitration in NewJersey Part 1, 8 Rur.-CAm. L.J. 1, 2-3, 7 (1976) (observing
New Jersey courts' early acceptance of arbitration)); see also Standard Oil Dev. Co.
Employees Union v. Esso Research & Eng'g Co., 38 N.J. Super. 106, 115, 118 A.2d 70,
75 (App. Div. 1955) (noting that the courts' initial hesitation to embrace arbitration
has been replaced with the recognition of and respect for the indispensability of arbitration in current economic life); Hoboken Mfrs. R.R Co., 132 N.J. Eq. at 117, 27 A.2d
at 154 (explaining the initial hostility towards arbitration as motivated byjudicialjealousy of private dispute resolution but excepting New Jersey courts from such behavior) (citation omitted); HOENIGER, supra note 4, § 1.03, at 1-3 (noting recent judicial
and legislative encouragement of arbitration by increasing the scope of arbitrability).
7 A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc. v. McCollough, 967 F.2d 1401, 1404 (9th Cir. 1992),
cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 970 (1993); Polk Bros. v. Chicago Truck Drivers, Helpers &
Warehouse Workers Union, 973 F.2d 593, 596 (7th Cir. 1992) (citations omitted);
Colonial Penn Ins. Co. v. Omaha Indem. Co., 943 F.2d 327, 333 (3d Cir. 1991) (citation omitted); Siegel v. Titan Indus. Corp., 779 F.2d 891, 892 (2d Cir. 1985) (citation
omitted); Connecticut Light & Power Co. v. Local 420, IBEW, 718 F.2d 14,19 (2d Cir.
1983) (remarking that great judicial deference should be given to an arbitration
award in recognition of the arbitrator's increased experience and expertise as compared to that of a judge) (citation omitted); Revere Copper & Brass Inc. v. Overseas
Private Inv. Corp., 628 F.2d 81, 83 (D.C. Cir.) (citation omitted), cert. denied, 446 U.S.
983 (1980); Engis Corp. v. Engis Ltd., 800 F. Supp. 627, 628 (N.D. Ill. 1992) (citation
omitted); Pompano-Windy City Partners Ltd. v. Bear Steams & Co., 794 F. Supp. 1265,
1272 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (citations omitted).
Furthermore, courts have regularly cautioned against unchecked review. See Mobil Oil Corp. v. Indep. Oil Workers Union, 677 F.2d 299, 302 (3d Cir. 1982); see also
General Drivers, Warehousemen & Helpers, Local Union No. 89 v. Riss & Co., 372
U.S. 517, 519 (1963) (holding that current Supreme Court decisions reflect a strong
labor policy encouraging private settlement of disputes, and limiting judicial review of
such decisions to exceptional cases). But see Detroit Auto. Inter-Ins. Exch. v. Gavin,
331 N.W.2d 418, 435 & n.11 (Mich. 1982) (acknowledging Michigan's more expansive review over arbitration awards than that of other jurisdictions) (citations
omitted).
For a discussion of judicial attitudes on the limited review of arbitral awards see
generally Editorial Note, Labor Arbitration in New Jersey, 14 RuT. L. REv. 143, 159, n.92
(1959) [hereinafter Editorial Note] (discussing generally the importance of having a
limited standard of judicial review); Judicial Review of Arbitration, supra note 3, at 681
(surveying briefly the contemporary standards of various jurisdictions on judicial review over arbitration awards); Stipanowich, supra note 2, at 982-88 (discussing the
limitations on judicial review).
8 See ROBERT M. RODMAN, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION wiTH FoRMs, § 25.15, at 56873 (West's Handbook Series 1984) (surveying arbitral standards of review in many
jurisdictions); see also Babjak, supra note 3, at 317-19 (discussing New Jersey's legisla-
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vacated for "gross" legal error.9 Conversely, many jurisdictions
have vacated awards in which the arbitrator acted in manifest disregard of the law.10 Still yet, other courts have upheld awards even
tive and judicial grounds for review of an award); Alan H. Katz, Note, 52 TUL. L. REV.
862, 867-68 (1978) (outlining briefly the scope ofjudicial review for arbitral error in
Louisiana); AnthonyJ. Basincki, Comment, CommercialArbitration Under the FederalAct:
Expanding the Scope ofJudicialReview, 35 U. Prrr. L. REv. 799, 805-09 (1974) (discussing
particularly judicial review in the federal context).
9 See, e.g., Ierna v. Arthur Murray Int'l, Inc., 833 F.2d 1472, 1476-77 (11th Cir.
1987) (stating that grounds for vacation include an arbitrator's "egregious" error);
Celtech, Inc. v. Broumand, 584 A.2d 1257, 1258 (D.C. 1991) (allowing judicial interference for corruption or "gross mistake"); State v. Public Safety Employees Ass'n, 798
P.2d 1281, 1285 (Alaska. 1990) (vacating for "gross" errors that are "obvious and significant") (citation omitted); Board of Educ. v. Prince George's Co. Educators' Ass'n,
522 A.2d 931, 941 (Md. 1987) (reviewing arbitration awards under Maryland's common law "palpable legal or factual error apparent on the face of the award" standard
or the "mistake so gross as to work a manifest injustice" standard); Perini, 129 N.J. at
488, 610 A.2d at 368 (citing the New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division's refusal to vacate the award where the arbitrators were not "clearly" mistaken, and also
pointing out the New Jersey Superior Court Chancery Division's refusal to overturn
the award absent a "gross mistake" or "clear disregard of applicable law"); Pacific Gas
& Elec. Co. v. Superior Ct., 277 Cal. App. 3d. 694, 701 (Ct. App.) (vacating an award
for "egregious" error, though defining the term as an "arbitrary remaking of the contract"), review granted and opinion superseded, 810 P.2d 997 (Cal. 1991), review denied, 19
Cal. Rptr. 2d 295 (Ct. App. 1993); NuVision, Inc. v. Dunscombe, 415 N.W.2d 234, 238
(Mich. Ct. App. 1987) (stating that the error "must be so material or so substantial as
to have governed the award, and but for which the award would have been substantially otherwise") (citation omitted); see also Carrs Fork Corp. v. Kodak Mining Co.,
809 S.W.2d 699, 701 (Ky. 1991) (adopting the "common dictionary definition of
'gross' [as] something immediately obvious or glaringly noticeable" and proposing to
vacate the award for the arbitrator's ignorance of the law). But see Rauh v. Rockford
Prods. Corp., 574 N.E.2d 636, 644 (Ill. 1991) (refusing to vacate an award for gross
legal errors unless the mistake appeared on the face of the award) (citation omitted).
Offering an internal contradiction, the Carrs court later adopted a slightly different
standard by refusing to enforce the award for its failure "to provide equity so as to
produce palpable error." Carrs, 809 S.W. 2d at 703.
10 See, e.g., Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 436-37 (1953), overruled by Rodriguez de
Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 484 (1989). Many federal
courts today continue to adhere to the Wilko rule. Health Servs. Management Corp. v.
Hughes, 975 F.2d 1253, 1267 (7th Cir. 1992); A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc. v. McCollough, 967 F.2d 1401, 1403 (9th Cir. 1992); Eichleay Corp. v. International Ass'n of
Bridge Workers, 944 F.2d 1047, 1056 (3d Cir. 1991) (citation omitted), cert. dismissed,
112 S.Ct. 1285 (1992); Fahnestock & Co., Inc. v. Waltman, 935 F.2d 512, 516 (2d Cir.
1991) (citation omitted), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 380 (1991) and 112 S. Ct. 1241 (1992);
Jih v. Long & Foster Real Estate, Inc., 800 F. Supp. 312, 317 (D. Md. 1992); Fairchild
& Co. v. Richmond, Fredericksburg, & Potomac R.R., 516 F. Supp. 1305, 1315 (D.D.C.
1981) (citation omitted); see also WestJersey R.R. v. Thomas, 23 N.J. Eq. 431, 440 (Ch.
1873) (vacating in the state court an award where the arbitrator disregarded certain
legal requirements).
In concurrence, Chief Justice Wilentz noted in Perini that there are at least two
federal circuits, the Eighth and the Eleventh Circuits, that have refused to adopt this
stringent "manifest disregard" standard. Perini, 129 N.J. at 526, 610 A.2d at 388 (Wilentz, C.J., concurring) (citations omitted). Some of the Eleventh Circuit decisions
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where the arbitrator erroneously applied the law." Finally, a limited number of courts have held that an award may not be disturbed for any legal error, regardless of the error's magnitude. 12
that have not adopted this standard are Robbins v. Day, 954 F.2d 679, 684 (11 th Cir.),
cert. denied sub nom. Robbins v. PaineWebber, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 201 (1992); Raiford v.
Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 903 F.2d 1410, 1412 (lth Cir. 1990);
O.R. Sec., Inc. v. Professional Planning Assocs., Inc., 857 F.2d 742, 747 (lth Cir.
1988). Some of the Eighth Circuit decisions that also either refused to adopt this
standard or found the standard satisfied include Marshall v. Green Giant Co., 942
F.2d 539, 550 (8th Cir. 1991); Stroh Container Co. v. Delphi Indus. Inc., 783 F.2d 743
(8th Cir.), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1141 (1986).
What constitutes a "manifest disregard" of the law, however, will differ from court
to court. See, e.g., Svoboda v. Negey Assocs., 655 F. Supp. 1329, 1332-33 (S.D.N.Y.
1987) (explaining that the term "disregard" means that the arbitrator ignored or did
not attend to the law despite an awareness of the legal principles) (footnote omitted);
Bechtel Constructors Corp. v. Detroit Carpenters Dist. Council, 610 F. Supp. 1550,
1555 (E.D. Mich. 1985) (equating the manifest disregard standard with a "manifest
error" standard) (citation omitted); Shearson Hayden Stone, Inc. v. Liang, 493 F.
Supp. 104, 108 (N.D. Ill. 1980) (pointing out that the award would not be vacated for
manifest disregard unless there was a failure to decide in accordance with the relevant
provisions of the law, and not mere error in the interpretation of the law) (citations
omitted), aftd, 653 F.2d 310 (7th Cir. 1981); Reynolds Sec., Inc. v. Macquown, 459 F.
Supp. 943, 945 (W.D. Pa. 1978) (adding that for manifest disregard to apply the arbitrator must have had not only an awareness of the law but also an understanding and
correct statement of the law); Bell Aerospace Co. Div. of Textron v. Local 516, UAW,
356 F. Supp. 354, 356 (W.D.N.Y. 1973) (same) (citing Fukaya Trading Co., S.A. v.
Eastern Marine Corp., 322 F. Supp. 278, 282 (E.D. La. 1971)), affd in part and rev'd in
part, 500 F.2d 921 (2d Cir. 1974).
11 See, e.g., News Am. Publications, Inc. v. Newark Typographical Union, Local 103,
918 F.2d 21, 24 (3d Cir. 1990) (ruling that Third Circuit courts may not review an
award to determine whether the arbitrator correctly applied principles of law) (citation omitted); In re Arbitration Between Marcy Lee Mfg. Co. & Cortley Fabrics Co.,
354 F.2d 42, 43 (2d Cir. 1965) (refusing to set aside an award for an erroneous determination or application of the law) (citation omitted); Textile Workers Union of Am.
v. American Thread Co., Local 1386, 291 F.2d 894, 896 (4th Cir. 1961) (remarking
that awards were upheld despite an arbitrator's erroneous interpretation even when
courts did not favor arbitration); cf. Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v.
Bobker, 808 F.2d 930, 933-37 (2d Cir. 1986) (proposing that a simple misinterpretation of a contract would not be grounds to vacate an award unless the error was "obvious and capable of being readily and instantly perceived by the average person
qualified to serve as an arbitrator"); Celtech, Inc. v. Broumand, 584 A.2d 1257, 1258
(D.C. 1991) (Mansfield, J., dissenting) (noting that courts will not disturb an award
even if the award is based on an erroneous interpretation of a contract) (citing I/S
Stavborg v. National Metal Converters, Inc., 500 F.2d 424, 432 (2d Cir. 1974)).
12 Tanoma Mining Co. v. Local Union No. 1269, UMWA, 896 F.2d 745, 749 (3d
Cir. 1990) (citation omitted); Padgett v. Dapelo, 791 F. Supp. 438, 441 (S.D.N.Y.
1992) (citation omitted), affd, 992 F.2d 320 (2d Cir. 1993); see also United
Paperworkers Int'l Union v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 38 (1987) (refusing to vacate
even for "serious" error); Local 1199, Drug, Hosp. & Health Care Employees Union v.
Brooks Drug Co., 956 F.2d 22, 25 (2d Cir. 1992)) (same); Las VegasJoint Executive
Bd. v. Riverboat Casino, 817 F.2d 524, 528 (9th Cir. 1987) (stating that an award
containing a factual or legal error is not to be vacated even where the arbitrator's view
of the law is seriously questionable) (citations omitted); Washington-Baltimore News-
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Other courts have denied enforcement where the error was
apparent on the face of the arbitration award.'" A few courts, howpaper Guild, Local 35 v. Washington Post Co., 442 F.2d 1234, 1239 (D.C. Cir. 1971)
(preferring not to vacate an award for legal or factual error unless it "compels the
violation of law or conduct contrary to accepted public policy") (footnote omitted).
Similarly, state courts have been reluctant to vacate for legal or factual error.
Arkansas Dep't of Parks & Tourism v. Resort Managers, 743 S.W.2d 389, 392 (Ark.
1988); Schnurmacher Holding, Inc. v. Noriega, 542 So. 2d 1327, 1329 (Fla. 1989)
(citation omitted); Fischer v. Guaranteed Concrete Co., 151 N.W.2d 266, 270 (Minn.
1967); P G Metals Co. v. Hofldn, 218 A.2d 238, 240 (Pa. 1966); Foust v. Aetna Casualty & Ins. Co., 786 P.2d 450, 451 (Colo. Ct. App. 1989) (citation omitted); Cady v.
Allstate Ins. Co., 747 P.2d 76, 80 (Idaho Ct. App. 1987) (footnote and citation omitted); School Comm. of Norton v. Norton Teachers' Assoc., 505 N.E.2d 531, 532
(Mass. App. Ct. 1987) (citation omitted). But see Carrs Fork Corp. v. Kodak Mining
Co., 809 S.W.2d 699, 703 (Ky. 1991) (Combs, J., concurring) (denouncing Kentucky's
arbitration statute for its potential to "close the courthouse doors as to mistakes of law
and fact, to persons who have elected to be bound by arbitration[,]" and stating that
"under our constitution, neither the parties nor the arbitrators can tie the hands of
the court on questions of law").
13 Pompano-Windy City Partners, Ltd. v. Bear Steams & Co., 794 F. Supp. 1265,
1272 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (noting that the error must be "obvious and capable of being
readily and instantly perceived by the average person qualified to serve as an arbitrator") (quoting Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Bobker, 808 F.2d 930,
933 (2d Cir. 1986)); Detroit Auto. Inter-Ins. Exch. v. Gavin, 331 N.W.2d 418, 434
(Mich. 1982) (limiting judicial review to those errors appearing on the face of the
award) (citation omitted). New Jersey courts have also adopted this prerequisite.
Daly v. Komline-Sanderson Eng'g Corp., 40 N.J. 175, 178, 191 A.2d 37, 38 (1963)
(citations omitted); Carhal Factors, Inc. v. Salkind, 5 N.J. 485, 491, 76 A.2d 252, 254
(1950) (citations omitted); Melvin P. Windsor, Inc. v. Mayflower Sav. & Loan, Ass'n,
115 N.J. Super. 219, 220-21, 278 A.2d 547, 547-48 (App. Div. 1971) (citations omitted); Carpenter v. Bloomer, 54 N.J. Super. 157, 168, 148 A.2d 497, 503 (App. Div.
1959).
At least one court abroad also adheres to the requirement that the error be apparent on the face of the award. See Martin Hunter, Note, Error on the Face of the
Award, 105 L. Q. REv. 539, 540 (1989) (discussing New Zealand's standard for vacating an arbitration award for errors of law apparent on the face of the award). Hunter
additionally noted that no public policy exists in New Zealand to prevent the parties
from agreeing that the courts cannot review the award. Id. at 540-41 (citations omitted). In fact, the commentator quoted one justice's observation that public policy
encourages the courts not to interfere where the parties desire finality. Id. (quotation
omitted). Hunter then cited a decision of the Supreme Court of Victoria, the highest
court of the New Zealand province of Victoria, in which the court qualified the error
on the face of the award principle by noting that the error must be one affecting the
case's outcome. Id. at 542 (citation omitted). Upon finding no "fundamental" legal
error, Hunter explained, the court dismissed the application to overturn the award.
Id. at 543. The author concluded by speculating as to the outcome of the battle between judicial supervision over arbitration and the parties' ability to displace that jurisdiction contractually. Id. at 544.
For a Canadian critique of the error on the face of the award standard, see generally W.H. Hurlburt, Setting Aside Private Non-Labour Arbitration Awards for Errors of
Law-Some Recent Decisions, 26 ALBERTA L. REv. 345 (1988). In this article on Canadian law, Hurlburt recited the standard in which legal error on the face of the award
would evidence that the arbitrator "misconducted himself," and as such, would constitute grounds for vacating the award. Id. at 345-46. The author then addressed recent
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ever, have refused to consider vacating an award unless there was
"no proper basis" for the award.1 4 Yet other courts have upheld
awards whenever the arbitrator rendered a fair and honest decision. 15 Finally, several jurisdictions have limited review to instances
cases implementing a new rule elevating the standard of an arbitrator's misconduct to
an error that was "patently unreasonable." Id. at 346. In discussing the merits of the
old and new standard, Hurlburt suggested that the older rule limited judicial review
and accordingly left arbitration "as much to itself as possible." Id. at 353-54. Hurlburt
also explained that the newer standard was a much broader one because the standard
grants judges the discretion to decide which awards to vacate. Id. at 354.
Similarly, Australian commentators have experienced conceptual difficulty with
the error on the face of the award standard. John Goldring, 54 AusrRmALLN L. J. 232,
232 (1980). Goldring stated that despite some criticism of setting aside an award for
an error on its face, these grounds remained the law of each of the Australian States
and Territories. Id. The commentator further explained that upon discovery of an
error, the court is obligated to review the award. Id. (citations omitted). Goldring
justified such review by noting the importance that there be "throughout the land, a
single system of law interpreted by a single system .

. . ."

Id. at 233.

Robbins v. Day, 954 F.2d 679, 684 (11th Cir. 1992), cert. denied sub nom. Robbins
v. PaineWebber, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 201 (1992); see also Brown v. Rauscher Pierce Refsnes,
Inc., 796 F. Supp. 496, 504 (M.D. Fla. 1992) (refusing to identify the "no proper basis"
standard as a "correct basis" for the award standard, and instead identifying the standard as one of a "justifiable basis"), affd, 994 F.2d 775 (lth Cir. 1993). The Brown
court also cautioned, however, that the justifiable basis standard should be limited to
instances in which the arbitrators committed egregious error, overstepped their authority, or otherwise misconducted themselves. Id.
15 See Independent Lift Truck Builders Union v. Hyster Co., 803 F. Supp. 1374,
1376 (C.D. Ill. 1992) (holding that the award would not be set aside if the arbitrators
provided the parties with a full and fair hearing, and the award subsequently contained an honest decision) (citation omitted); Bechtel Constructors Corp. v. Detroit
Carpenters Dist. Council, 610 F. Supp. 1550, 1555 (E.D. Mich. 1985) (adopting the
same standard as that found in Independent) (citing Coast Trading Co. v. Pacific Molasses Co., 681 F.2d 1195, 1198 (9th Cir. 1982)); Bailey & Williams v. Westfall, 727
S.W.2d 86, 90 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987) (vacating an award only where there was a "gross
mistake," but defining "gross" in terms of failure to exercise honestjudgment) (citation omitted); David A. Brooks Enters., Inc. v. First Sys. Agencies, 370 N.W.2d 434,
436 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985) (adopting a "bad faith or failure to exercise and honest
judgment" approach) (citation omitted).
For a review of decisions that have adopted the "fair" standard, see National Post
Office Mailhandlers v. United States Postal Serv., 751 F.2d 834, 841 (6th Cir. 1985)
(stating that review of arbitration awards should be limited to determining whether a
fundamentally fair hearing was denied) (citing Grahams Serv., Inc. v. Teamsters Local
975, 700 F.2d 420, 422 (8th Cir. 1982)); Totem Marine Tug & Barge, Inc. v. North
Am. Towing, Inc., 607 F.2d 649, 651 (5th Cir. 1979) (same) (citation omitted); Bell
Aerospace Co. Div. of Textron v. Local 516, UAW, 500 F.2d 921, 923 (2d Cir. 1974)
(same); Newark Stereotypers' Union No. 18 v. Newark Morning Ledger Co., 397 F.2d
594, 600 (3d Cir.) (articulating that Third Circuit law demands more than a mere
error of law-, it must be one that deprives a party of a fair hearing), cert. denied, 393
U.S. 954 (1968);Jackson Trak Group, Inc. v. Mid-States Port Auth., 751 P.2d 122, 127
(Kan. 1988) (noting that most errors would generally not constitute grounds for vacating an award fairly made); Sonotone Corp. v. Hayes, 2 N.J. Super. 407, 411, 64 A.2d
249, 250 (Ch. Div.) (reaffirming the notion that equity and good conscience were
valid grounds for upholding an award), rev'd, 4 N.J. Super. 326, 67 A.2d 184 (App.
14
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of fraud, corruption, or some other similar wrongdoing specifically
16
enunciated in the applicable arbitration statute.
Thus, the New Jersey Supreme Court had many alternative
theories to choose from when the court examined the standards of
review to apply in Perini v. Greate Bay Hotel & Casino, Inc.1 7 Ultimately, however, the court fashioned its own standard for review of
arbitration awards by combining selected aspects of standards articulated in other jurisdictions.1 8 Specifically, the Perinicourt held
that an arbitration award would be vacated where an arbitrator
committed gross, unmistakable, or not reasonably debatable errors
Div. 1949); Ruckman v. Ransom, 23 N.J. Eq. 118, 120 (Ch. 1872) (holding that the
arbitrators need not base their award on "mere dry principles of law," but may render
a decision founded on principles of "equity and good conscience"); see also Aetna
Casualty & Sur. Co. v. Deitrich, 803 F. Supp. 1032, 1038 (M.D. Pa. 1992) (refusing to
vacate an award absent a "clear" showing that a hearing was denied or that fraud,
corruption, or similar wrongdoing rendered the award unjust, inequitable, or unconscionable) (citations omitted); Silverman v. Benmor Coats, Inc., 461 N.E.2d 1261,
1266 (N.Y. 1984) (holding that the arbitrator "may do justice as he sees it, applying
his own sense of law and equity to the facts as he finds them to be and making an
award reflecting the spirit rather than the letter of the agreement").
16 Katz, supra note 8, at 864. Limiting review to these circumstances has been particularly applicable in the New Jersey courts. County College of Morris Staff v. County
College of Morristown, 100 N.J. 383, 391, 495 A.2d 865, 869 (1985);Johowern Corp. v.
Affiliated Interior Designers, Inc., 187 N.J. Super. 195, 199, 453 A.2d 1370, 1372 (App.
Div. 1982) (citing Barcon Assocs. v. Tri-County Asphalt Corp., 86 NJ. 179, 187-88, 430
A.2d 214, 218 (1991)); Selected Risks Ins. Co. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 179 NJ. Super. 444,
451, 432 A.2d 544, 548 (App. Div. 1981) (citing Kearny PBA Local No. 21 v. Kearny,
81 N.J. 208, 221, 405 A.2d 393, 399 (1979)), certif denied, 88 N.J. 489, 443 A.2d 705
(1981); Brooks v. Pennsylvania Mfrs. Ass'n Ins., 121 N.J. Super. 51, 54, 296 A.2d 72, 74
(App. Div. 1972), modified, 62 N.J. 583, 303 A.2d 884 (1973); Local Union 560, I.B.T. v.
Eazor Express, Inc., 95 N.J. Super. 219, 227, 230 A.2d 521, 525 (App. Div. 1967); Anco
Prods. Corp. v. TV Prods. Corp., 23 N.J. Super. 116, 123, 92 A.2d 625, 628 (App. Div.
1952); Harsen v. Board of Educ. of W. Milford, 132 N.J. Super. 365, 371, 333 A.2d 580,
584 (Law Div. 1975); International Assoc. of Machinists v. Bergen Ave. Business Owners' Assoc., 3 N.J. Super. 558, 565, 67 A.2d 362, 366 (Law Div. 1949); Caparaso v.
Durante, 132 NJ.L. 16, 17, 38 A.2d 133, 134 (1944), aft'd, 132 NJ.L. 419, 40 A.2d 649
(1945); Deakman v. Odd Fellows Hall Ass'n ofJersey City, 110 N.J.L. 304, 305-06, 164
A. 256, 257 (1933); see also Lozano v. Maryland Casualty Co., 850 F.2d 1470, 1472
(11th Cir. 1988) (citing Florida law in support of the proposition that only the presence of the enumerated statutory grounds would subject an award to review and vacation, and that legal error did not fall into this category) (citations omitted); Kirk v.
Board of Educ. of Bremen Community High Sch. Dist., 811 F.2d 347, 354 (7th Cir.
1987) (holding that evidence of fraud, corruption, or partiality was only one of five
grounds for vacating an award) (citation omitted); Moncharsh v. Hiely & Blase, 832
P.2d 899, 915 (Cal. 1992) (surveying other jurisdictions' adoption of this standard)
(citations omitted); cf. In re Arbitration Between Grover, 80 N.J. 235, 237, 403 A.2d
448, 456 (1979) (Pashman,J., dissenting) (bemoaning the court's departure from this
strict standard of review, and predicting that such action would create "unbounded"
judicial review of arbitration proceedings) (citation omitted).
17 129 N.J. 479, 610 A.2d 364 (1992).
18 See id. at 494-97, 610 A.2d at 371-73.
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of law or where the arbitrator manifestly disregarded the law, and
the result of the arbitration was unjust.19
Greate Bay Hotel & Casino, Inc., trading as Sands Hotel & Casino (Sands), entered into an agreement with Perini Corporation
(Perini) in July 1983 to renovate the Sands hotel and casino for a
$600,000 management fee.20 Although the contract had explicitly
proscribed terminating the contract after substantial completion,
Sands later attempted to do so on grounds that Perini had not
timely completed the work.2 1
In response to what Perini perceived as Sands's breach of contract, Perini filed suit in the Superior Court, Chancery Division,
which referred the termination issue and other disputed matters to
arbitration. 22 A panel of arbitrators awarded Sands lost profit damset the contractual balance due Perini
ages of $14.5 million 23 and
24
interest.
plus
$300,000
at
Dissatisfied with this award, Perini appealed to the chancery
division. 25 Finding that the arbitrators had based the damage
award on sufficient evidence, the court denied Perini's motion to
19 Id. at 496, 610 A.2d at 372-73. To determine whether the arbitrator had committed gross, unmistakable, or not reasonably debatable errors of law, the court also
addressed several contractual issues, such as whether the contract between the parties
had been substantially completed and whether lost profits should have been awarded.
Id. at 497-517, 610 A.2d at 373-83. This Note, however, focuses only on the arbitration
aspects of the Perini court's decision.
20 Id. at 484-85, 610 A.2d at 366-67. Perini's responsibilities were those of a general
contractor hired to manage the casino renovation project. Id. at 485, 610 A.2d at 367.
Sands had argued that Perini was to receive 4% of the contract price if the price
exceeded $20 million, and that the actual fee was thus $771,000. Id. at 511 n.3, 610
A.2d at 380 n.3. The appellate division rejected this argument, however, and concluded that Perini's fee was $600,000. Id.
21 Id. at 487, 610 A.2d at 368. Perini contended that the attempted termination
took place on December 21, 1984, three months after the entire project would be
substantially completed, September 14, 1984. Id.
22 Id.
23 The decision was split two-to-one, with the attorney-arbitrator dissenting. Id. at
487, 610 A.2d at 368.
24 Id. This amount came to $300,000 plus interest. Id. The panel, however, did
not explicitly decide whether Sands had wrongfully terminated the contract after Perini's substantial completion. Id.
25 Id. Perini protested that, in comparison to its $600,000 management fee, the
award of over $14 million dollars, representing 2400% of Perini's fee, was grossly
disproportionate. Id. at 511, 610 A.2d at 300. Had it realized that it would be held
liable for over $14 million dollars in damages for its $600,000 fee, Perini argued that it
would have never entered into the original contract. Id. Further, Perini asserted that
allowing the lost profit award to stand violated the "well-established rule" which limited damages after substantial completion. Id. at 500, 610 A.2d at 374.
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vacate the award. 26 The court further declared that the arbitrators
had not made a "gross mistake" or clearly disregarded the applicable law in awarding Sands lost profits, of which either was necessary
to overturn the award.
The appellate division affirmed, holding that an award should
not be vacated absent a clear mistake of law. 28 The court also held
that the award was not unjust because it was not disproportionate
to the contract price.2 9 Additionally, the court concluded that in
light of the evidence submitted to the arbitrators, lost profits were
reasonably foreseeable upon breach of the contract, and that these
lost profit damages were not speculative. 0
Subsequently, the New Jersey Supreme Court granted certification"1 to address three issues: (1) what standard of review should
be adopted for an alleged mistake of law; (2) whether the definition of "undue means," a phrase of statutory origin, 2 encompassed
a mistake of law; and (3) whether the possible excessiveness of the
award to Sands was sufficient grounds for its vacation.3' The court
held that New Jersey's standard of review permitted vacation of an
arbitration award where the arbitrator's error was gross, unmistakable, undebatable, or in manifest disregard of applicable law and
led to an unjust result.3 4 The supreme court also explained that
the phrase "undue means" encompassed a mistake of law in which
the arbitrator intended to follow the law, but clearly mistook the
law and, thus, committed a mistake apparent on the face of the
26 Id. at 487-88, 610 A.2d at 368. The court instead granted Sands's motion to
confirm the award. Id.
27 Id. at 488, 610 A.2d at 368. Noting the chanceryjudge's comment that the contract was substantially completed on September 15, 1984, the Perini court observed
that the chancery judge was "greatly troubled" with the arbitrators' award of lost profits after that date. Id. at 506, 610 A.2d at 378.
28 Id. With regard to the substantial completion issue, the appellate division concluded that Perini did not complete the contractually mandated work in a timely
manner. Id.
29 Id. In weighing the award of $14.5 million in lost profits against the $24 million
actual contract price, the court found the award reasonable. Id.
30 Id.
31 Perini Corp. v. Greate Bay Hotel & Casino, Inc., 127 N.J. 533, 606 A.2d 353
(1991).
32 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:24-8 (West 1952) (outlining the grounds for vacating an
arbitration award). Section 2A:24-8(a), the undue means provision, reads in pertinent part: "The court shall vacate the award in any of the following cases: ... [w]here
the award was procured by corruption, fraud or undue means;..." Id. For a general
discussion of modem arbitration statutes, see DoMKE, supra note 1, §§ 4.01 & 4.02, at
27-31. For a list of each state's arbitration statute, see id., app. IX at 1-3.
33 Perini, 129 N.J. at 488-89, 610 A.2d at 368-69.
34 Id. at 496-97, 610 A.2d at 372-73.
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award.3 5 Lastly, the court determined that mere excessiveness of
an arbitration award was not enough to warrant its vacation.3 6
Based upon these principles of law, the supreme court affirmed the
appellate division's decision. 7
In Wilko v. Swan,3 8 the federal standard for review, different
from that later adopted by New Jersey courts, was articulated when
the United States Supreme Court addressed whether section 14 of
the Securities and Exchange Act (Securities Act) of 1933 s3 voided a
compulsory arbitration agreement. 40 The Supreme Court stated
Id. at 494, 610 A.2d at 371.
Id. at 510, 610 A.2d at 379-80.
37 Id. at 489, 610 A.2d at 369.
38 346 U.S. 427 (1953), overruled by Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American
Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 484 (1989). For a general discussion of Wiko and its
progeny, see Edgar H. Brenner, The Enforcement of Arbitration Awards, in COMmEaRCIAL
ARBrrRATON FOR THE 1990s, at 97-100 (Richard J. Medalie ed., 1991); Stephen H.
Kupperman & George C. Freeman, III, Selected Topics in Securities Arbitration:Rule 15c22, Fraud,Duress, Unconscionability, Waiver, Class Arbitration, Punitive Damages, Rights of
Review, and Attorneys' Fees and Costs, 65 TUL. L. REv. 1547, 1549-53 (1991); Hiroshi
Motomura, Arbitration and CollateralEstoppel: Using Preclusionto Shape ProceduralChoices,
63 TUL. L. REv. 29, 54-62 (1988); Jay R. Sever, Comment, The Relaxation of Inarbitrability and Public Policy Checks on U.S. and ForeignArbitration:ArbitrationOut of Control,
65 TUL. L. Rv. 1661, 1670-80 (1991) [hereinafter Relaxation]; F. Chet Taylor, Note,
The Arbitrability of FederalSecurities Claims:Wilko's Swan Song, 42 U. MiAMi. L. REv. 203
(1987).
Although Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express overruled the Wilko
holding by voiding the agreement to arbitrate under § 14 of the Securities Act, the
Rodriguez Court did not address the manifest disregard dicta. Rodriguez, 490 U.S. at
484-85. For a brief survey of Rodriguez, see J.R. Sever, Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc.: A Green Light To Arbitration, A Yellow Light To Investors, 64
TUL. L. Rv. 1312, 1312-20 (1990) [hereinafter Green Light].
39 Section 14 of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1933 (Securities Act), provides
in pertinent part: "Any condition, stipulation, or provision binding any person acquiring any security to waive compliance with any provision of this title or of the rules and
Regulations of the Commission shall be void." Securities Act of 1933, ch. 38, § 14, 48
Stat. 74, 84 (1933) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77n (1988)).
40 Wilko, 346 U.S. at 430. In Wilko, the petitioners alleged that the respondents,
partners in a securities brokerage firm, induced them to purchase 1600 shares of a
corporation through fraudulent misrepresentations and omissions. Id. at 428-29.
The parties' contract contained an arbitration clause stating that in the event of a
dispute, the parties would submit their claims to an arbitrator. Id. at 429-30. Moving
to stay the trial under § 3 of the United States Arbitration Act, the respondents
claimed that the petitioners were bound to the arbitration clause in their contract. Id.
at 429. Section 3 of the United States Arbitration Act provides:
If any suit or proceeding be brought in any of the courts of the United
States upon any issue referable to arbitration under an agreement in
writing for such arbitration, the court in which such suit is pending,
upon being satisfied that the issue involved in such suit or proceeding is
referable to arbitration under such an agreement, shall on application
of one of the parties stay the trial of the action until such arbitration has
been had in accordance with the terms of the agreement, providing the
35
36
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that arbitrators had a duty to follow the law even where the parties'
agreement did not so specify.4 1 After carefully weighing the advantages of arbitration against the possible economic hazards posed to
investors by enforcement of an arbitration clause, the Court found
the parties' compulsory arbitration agreement invalid.42 Rejecting
the holding of the Second Circuit, the Supreme Court held that
because arbitrators were not legally trained,4" their failure to follow
4
the law could not alone constitute grounds for vacating an award.
The Court instead required evidence on the face of the award that
the arbitrators failed to follow the law in order for the award to be
vacated.4 5
In oft-quoted dicta, the Wilko Court next articulated its "manifest disregard" standard,46 explaining that judicial review was
proper where an arbitrator manifestly disregarded the law. 47 The
Court clarified that judicial review was improper, however, where
the arbitrator erred only in the interpretation of the law. 48 For
these reasons, the majority concluded that enforcement of the
applicant for the stay is not in default in proceeding with such
arbitration.
9 U.S.C. § 3 (1988). The petitioner argued that the clause directly conflicted with the
Securities Act because the clause waived "compliance with" another provision that set
jurisdiction over these matters in the district courts. Id. at 432-33 (citation omitted).
41 Wilko, 346 U.S. at 433-34.
42 Id. at 438. For a discussion of the application of the Wi/ko balancing test, see LAN
R. MACNEIL, AMERICAN ARBITRATION LAw REFORMATION-NATONALIZATION-INTERNATIONALIZATION 63-64 (1992). In 1987, the United States Supreme Court reconsidered
the enforceability of an arbitration clause in the context of an alleged Securities Act
violation in Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon. Shearson/American Express,
Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 222 (1987). Justice O'Connor, writing for the majority, resolved the conflict among the federal courts and held, inter alia, that the arbitrability of certain claims under the Securities Act should be enforced. Id. at 238. In so
doing, the Court reflected upon its former distrust of arbitration and noted that this
outlook had since become outmoded and inappropriate. Id. at 233.
43 Wiko, 346 U.S. at 436. The Court noted that arbitrators did not have the benefit
of judicial instruction on the law. Id.
44 Id. The Court implicitly limited this holding, however, to those awards governed by § 10 of the United States Arbitration Act. Id.
45 Id.
46 Id. at 436-37. The Court stated that "[i] n unrestricted submissions [ ] [to arbitration,] .. . the interpretation of the law by the arbitrators in contrast to manifest disregard are not subject, in the federal courts, to judicial review for error in
interpretation." Id. (citations omitted).
47 Id. at 436. Although, dissenting, Justice Frankfurter affirmed the notion that
arbitrators "may not disregard the law." Id. at 440 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). Looking to the record for grounds on which to vacate the award, the Justice, however,
found no violation of the law. Id. For this reason,Justice Frankfurter argued that the
Court should have affirmed the Second Circuit Court of Appeals's decision. Id.
48 Id. at 436-37 (citations omitted); see alsoJudicialReview of Arbitration, supranote 3,
at 685-87 (discussing awards based on an erroneous ruling).
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compulsory arbitration agreement was inappropriate in the present case. 49
The United States Supreme Court again addressed the reviewability of arbitration awards in United Paperworkersv. Misco.5 ° Specifically, the Misco Court considered the enforceability of an
arbitration award rendered pursuant to a collective bargaining
agreement."' Justice White, writing for a unanimous Court, affirmed the notion that courts could not review the merits of an
arbitrator's decision and, therefore, could not vacate an award
based upon a misinterpretation of a contract. 52 The Court asserted
that the fact that parties chose to have their disputes settled by an
arbitrator, rather than a judge, insulated an award based on legal
error from judicial review.53 The Court further concluded that
even where an arbitrator committed "serious error" the award
could not be overturned.54 Relying on the foregoing analysis, the
Court reversed the judgment of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals
and affirmed the award rendered pursuant to the collective bargaining agreement.55
The New Jersey courts first addressed the reviewability of arbitration awards containing legal error in Held v. Comfort Bus Line,
Inc.56 In Held, the plaintiffs, litigants in a tort action for negligence, asserted that an inadequate arbitral award constituted legal
error.5 The NewJersey Supreme Court concluded that an arbitra49 Wik0, 346 U.S. at 438.
50 484 U.S. 29 (1987).
51 Id. at 31. For a discussion of the precursors to Misco, an analysis of Misco, and
reflections on decisions following Misco, see Eileen Nowikowski, Public Policy Exception
to the Enforcement of Labor Arbitration Awards, 68 MicH. B.J. 626, 626-31 (1989); see also
Amanda J. Berlowe, Comment, Judicial Deference to Grievance Arbitration in the Private
Sector: Saving Grace in the Searchfor a Well-Defined Public Policy Exception, 42 U. MAM L.
REv. 767, 791-98 (1988) (criticizing the impact of Misco's public policy exception
grounds for vacating an arbitration award).
52 Misco, 484 U.S. at 36; see Bret F. Randall, Comment, The History, Application, and
Policy of the Judicially Created Standards of Review for Arbitration Awards, 1992 B.Y.U. L.
REv. 759, 762 (explaining Misco's affirmance of an arbitration award that arose out of
the essence of the contract).
53 Misco, 484 U.S. at 37-38.
54 Id. at 38.
55 Id. at 45. Justice Blackmun, addressing a different issue than the review of an
arbitration award, wrote a separate concurrence in which Justice Brennanjoined. Id.
at 46 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
56 136 N.J.L. 640, 57 A.2d 20 (1948). The court was deciding this issue in response
to a party's request to defer confirmation of the award until application was made to
the arbitrators for reconsideration. Id. at 641, 57 A.2d at 21.
57 Id. at 641, 643, 57 A.2d at 21, 22. The dispute in Held arose when 21 tort suits
for negligence were filed as a result of a bus accident on a bridge crossing the Passaic
River between Passaic and Wallington, NewJersey. Id. at 640-41, 57 A.2d at 21. Pursu-
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tion award secured by "undue means" was impeachable."8 The
court indirectly acknowledged that a mere mistake of law was insufficient grounds for vacating an arbitration award.5 9 The court
noted, however, that a mistake of law was "fatal" where the magnitude of the error suggested that there was either fraud, or misconduct, or a failure of intent. 6° In conclusion, the court held that a
party's discontent with the inadequacy of an award was insufficient
grounds for remittal to an arbitrator. 6 '
In Brooks v. PennsylvaniaManufacturersAss'n Insurance Co., 62 the
appellate division reiterated the principle articulated in Held that
an arbitration award secured by "undue means" could be reviewed
and vacated. 6 3 Without citing any authority, however, the Brooks
court revised the Held standard by establishing a presumption that,
absent any indication on the record to the contrary, an arbitrator
intended to follow the law.' As a consequence of this presumpant to an arbitration agreement, the matters were referred to two arbitrators. Id. at
641, 57 A.2d at 21.
58 Id., 57 A.2d at 22 (citation omitted). The court explained the phrase "undue
means" as a situation where the arbitrator intended to follow the law, but clearly mistook the law, and the arbitrator either stated this mistake or the mistake appeared on
the face of the award. Id. at 642, 57 A.2d at 22 (citing Leslie v. Leslie, 50 N.J. Eq. 103,
107-08, 24 A. 319, 320 (Ch. 1892); Taylor v. Sayre, 4 N.J.L. 647, 650 (1855); Bell v.
Price, 23 N.J. Eq. 578, 590 (Ch. 1849)). While the Bell and Leslie courts had articulated
the principle of impeaching an award where the foregoing conditions were met,
neither court had made a specific reference equating these conditions with the
phrase "undue means." See Bell 23 N.J. Eq. at 590; Leslie, 50 N.J. Eq. at 107-08, 24 A. at
320. Thus, the court's later attempt to define the phrase "undue means" in Perez v.
American Bankers Insurance Co. of lorida may be traced back to Helds extension of the
holdings in cases preceding it. See Perez v. American Bankers Ins. Co., 81 N.J. 415,
420, 409 A.2d 269, 271 (1979). For a general discussion of the Perez case, see infra
notes 69-73 and accompanying text.
59 Held, 136 N.J.L. at 642, 57 A.2d at 22.
60 Id. at 642, 57 A.2d at 22. This standard was slightly different than the one enunciated in Bell v. Price and Leslie v. Leslie. Bell, 22 N.J.L. at 590 (holding that the arbitrators must have mistaken the rule in "some palpable and material point"); Leslie, 50
N.J. Eq. at 108, 24 A. at 320 (holding that the arbitrators must have mistaken the law
in a "material respect").
61 Held, 136 N.J.L. at 643, 57 A.2d at 22.
62 121 N.J. Super. 51, 296 A.2d 72 (App. Div. 1972), modified on other grounds, 62
N.J. 583, 303 A.2d 884 (1973).
63 Id. at 54, 296 A.2d at 74. In Brooks, the appellate division decided whether to
affirm the trial court's decision to modify certain portions of an arbitration award and
confirm the remainder of the award. Id. The plaintiff in Brooks was injured in an
accident with an uninsured motorist. Brooks, 62 N.J. at 585, 303 A.2d at 885. The
plaintiff filed a claim pursuant to an uninsured motorist clause in an insurance liability policy. Id. The matter was then submitted to an arbitrator in accordance with the
insurance policy. Id. The arbitrator awarded the plaintiff a credit for money received
under a pending workmen's compensation claim. Id. The trial court subsequently
invalidated the credit provision of the arbitral award. Id.
64 Brooks, 121 N.J. Super. at 55, 296 A.2d at 74. In a concurring opinion in Perini,
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tion, the appellate panel suggested that a court could vacate an
award for any legal error where the record was deficient of any
reasoning to support an arbitrator's award.6 5 Although the court
recognized that an arbitration award based only on an arbitrator's
personal sense of equity and justice, rather than on the law, was
permissible,6 6 the court did not adopt this standard. Instead, relying upon a presumption that the arbitrator had intended to follow the law and erred in the decision, the court affirmed the lower
court's decision to vacate the disputed portion of the award.",
The New Jersey Supreme Court continued this trend towards
expansion of judicial review in Perez v. American Bankers Insurance
Co.,69 by extending the meaning of the phrase "undue means."7"
Writing for a unanimous court, Justice Sullivan concluded that the
requirement that the arbitrators must have intended to follow the
Chief Justice Wilentz viewed this presumption as an unfortunate departing point for
the liberal approach that other courts had been adopting in vacating awards. Perini
Corp. v. Greate Bay Hotel & Casino, Inc., 129 N.J. 479, 522, 610 A.2d 364, 386 (Wilentz, C.J., concurring); see infra note 129 and accompanying text (clarifying Chief
Justice Wilentz's critical analysis of Brooks). See also Shearson/American Express v.
McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 232 (1987) (affirming the importance of limited judicial
review, and observing that a presumption that the arbitrators would not follow the law
was unwarranted) (citation omitted). Not long after Brooks, the court in Ukrainian
National Urban Renewal Corp. v. Muscarelle, Inc. adopted this philosophy, stating that
unless the award clearly indicated the contrary, it was accepted that the arbitrator
intended to apply the law. Ukrainian Nat'l Urban Renewal Corp. v. Muscarelle, Inc.,
151 N.J. Super. 386, 400, 376 A.2d 1299, 1306 (App. Div.) (citation omitted), certif.
denied, 75 N.J. 529, 384 A.2d 509 (1977); see also In re Arbitration Between Grover, 151
N.J. Super. 403, 417, 376 A.2d 1308, 1315 (App. Div. 1977) (Lamer, J., dissenting)
(noting that since Brooks, a court should presume that an arbitrator intended to follow
the law, unless the record demonstrates otherwise), rev'd, 80 N.J. 221, 403 A.2d 448
(1979); cf.Communications Workers, Local 1087 v. Monmouth County Bd. of Social
Servs., 96 N.J. 442, 450, 476 A.2d 777, 781 (1984) (noting the slightly different presumption that the parties intended to have their dispute settled according to legal
principles unless their agreement stipulated otherwise) (citation omitted). Interestingly, the court in Taylor v. Sayre suggested that where an arbitrator intended to follow
the law but misapplied it, "the court will correct the error, for it will assume that it is
not his award, in other words, is not the award he intended to make." Taylor v. Sayre, 4
N.J. 647, 650 (1855) (citations omitted).
65 Brooks, 121 N.J. Super. at 55, 296 A.2d at 74.
66 Brooks, 121 N.J. Super. at 55, 296 A.2d at 74 (citing Collingswood Hosiery Mills v.
American Fed'n of Hosiery Workers, 31 N.J. Super. 466, 471, 107 A.2d 43, 45 (App.
Div. 1954)).
67 Id.
68 Id. at 55, 60-61, 296 A.2d at 74, 77-78.
69 81 N.J. 415, 409 A.2d 269 (1979). Perez concerned a claim protesting the validity
of a certain arbitration provision in an insurance policy. Id. at 416, 403 A.2d at 269.
70 Id. at 420, 409 A.2d at 271 (citations omitted). An arbitrator's contradictory
findings, the court ruled, would similarly constitute "undue means." Id. (citations
omitted).
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law and then erred was generally no longer applicable.7" Instead,
the court stated that a mistake of law was generally sufficient to
overturn the award.7 2 Finding that the arbitrator in Perez may have
made such a mistake, the court reversed the appellate division's
holding and reinstated the trial court's ruling vacating the award.7 3
Finally, one week before the Perini decision, the Supreme
4 ruled
Court of California in Moncharsh v. Hiely & Blasi'
on the
issue of whether to reverse an arbitrator's award that was erroneous.7 5 Chief Justice Lucas, writing for the majority, stated that a
mistake of law was generally not grounds for reversal except in the
rarest of instances. 7 6 Although the trial court had held that an error appearing on the face of an award would subject it to vacation,
the supreme court disagreed.77
ChiefJustice Lucas provided two separate justifications for employing limited review in the face of possible legal error.78 First,
the court observed that when parties choose arbitration as the forum for resolving their dispute, they must assume the risk that a
legal error may be committed. 79 Next, the chief justice noted that
71 Id.
72 Id.
73 Id. at 420-21, 409 A.2d at 271-72.
74 832 P.2d 899 (Cal. 1992). In Moncharsh, an employment dispute between an

attorney and his former law firm was submitted to an arbitrator under an arbitration
clause of the parties' employment contract. Id. at 900-01. The dispute concerned the
enforceability of a provision in the parties' employment agreement that proscribed
the attorney from encouraging clients to leave the firm should the attorney terminate
his employment with the firm. Id. The arbitrator determined that the attorney was
bound to the provision and granted the firm an award. Id. at 901. Both the California Superior Court and Court of Appeals affirmed the arbitrator's decision, concluding that the alleged error was not apparent on the face of the award. Id. at 902. For a
brief survey of Moncharsh, see MichaelJ. Smith, Note, Efficient Injustice: The Demise of the
"SubstantialInjustice" Exception to Arbitral Finality, 1993J. Disp. RESOL. 209, 209-12; see
also Blue Cross v. Jones, 23 Cal. Rptr. 2d 359, 362 (Ct. App. 1993) (discussing
Moncharsh's standard of judicial review, and clarifying the "excess of power"
provisions).
75 Moncharsh, 832 P.2d at 900. The Moncharsh decision came only one year after
the California Court of Appeals, Third District, passedjudgment on Pacific Gas &Elec.
Co. v. Superior Court. Id. at 899; Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Superior Court, 277 Cal.
Rptr. 694, 694 (Ct. App. 1991), review granted and opinion superseded, 810 P.2d 997 (Cal.
1991), review denied, 19 Cal. Rptr. 2d 295 (Ct. App. 1993). In Pacific Gas & Electric, the
court held that no review was available for "mere" legal or factual error. Pacific Gas &
Elec., 277 Cal. Rptr. at 700. The award may be vacated, however, the court cautioned,
on grounds that the arbitrators exceeded their power by arbitrarily remaking the contract. Id.
76 Moncharsh, 832 P.2d at 904.
77 Id. at 902, 915-16.
78 Id. at 904.
79 Id. But see Detroit Auto. Inter-Ins. Exch. v. Gavin, 331 N.W.2d 418, 429 (Mich.

1993]

NOTE

1015

the legislature had already minimized the risk of error by providing
for vacation of the award where there were problems with the arbi80
tration or where there were inherent deficiencies in the award.
The court then weighed each of the risks involved and ruled in
favor of upholding the arbitral process regardless of any error resulting in "substantial injustice.""'
Additionally, the court spurned the idea that a misuse of
power existed where an arbitrator erred according to the law.8 2 Instead, the court reasoned, an arbitrator's powers included resolving the merits of the controversy submitted by the parties.8 " As the
"merits" necessarily encompass all questions of law, the court concluded that an error of law is simply not grounds for denying enforcement of the award.8 4
These conflicting views on judicial review of arbitration awards
presented the New Jersey Supreme Court in Perini Corp. v. Greate
1982) (arguing that in statutory arbitrations, parties do not assume the risk of the
arbitrator's legal error).
80 Moncharsh, 832 P.2d at 905 (citation omitted).
81 Id. at 915-16. Justice Kennard, however, completely disagreed with the court's
refusal to reverse where an injustice occurred. Id. at 920 (Kennard, J., concurring in
part, dissenting in part). The justice explained that the terms "gross error" and error
on a "palpable and material point," grounds used by earlier courts to vacate an award,
were inherently suggestive of the concept of "substantial injustice." Id. at 921 (KennardJ, concurring in part, dissenting in part). Moreover, the justice insisted that the
majority was wrong in concluding from the absence of such an express provision that
the legislature's intent was to exclude this provision. Id. at 922-24 (Kennard, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). Instead, the justice pointed to other courts that
had equated the "excess of power" provision with substantial injustice. Id. at 924
(Kennard, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (citations omitted). The justice
further noted that the term "fraud" was also indicative of the legislature's intent to
encompass the notion of "substantial injustice." Id. (citation omitted). Justice Kennard concluded that for the foregoing reasons and in light of the judiciary's unique
role in ensuring that justice is served, the majority's holding was deficient. Id. Using
a "substantial injustice" test, the justice found none present and therefore concurred
in the result only. Id.
For support of Justice Kennard's view in another jurisdiction, see Moseley, Hallgarten, Estabrook & Weeden, Inc. v. Ellis, 849 F.2d 264, 272 (7th Cir. 1988) (refusing
to vacate an award where the arbitrators may have made a mistake of law but no
injustice resulted); Bailey & Williams v. Westfall 727 S.W.2d 86, 90 (Tex. Ct. App.
1987) (upholding vacation of awards, in part, for errors resulting in some "great and
manifest wrong and injustice") (citation omitted). See also Patricia Shuler Schimbor,
Address at the American Bar Association Annual Meeting (Aug. 11, 1993) (expressing
concern with such a standard in remarks as panelist for the program entitled East
Coast or West Coast and Eveywhere in Between: Should Arbitration Awards be Reviewed to
Correct Errors of Law that Lead to an "Unjust"Result?) (notes on file with Seton Hall Law
Reviw).
82 Moncharsh, 832 P.2d at 916 (citations omitted).
83 Id. (citation omitted).
84 Id.
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Bay Hotel & Casino, Inc. 5 with no easy task in formulating its own
standard of review. 6 Writing for the plurality, Justice O'Hern prefaced his analysis of Perini with a short discussion of the changing
judicial attitudes towards arbitration in general, and particularly in
New Jersey.8 7
The supreme court explained that the parties in the case had
opted to use the procedures of arbitration set out by the American
Arbitration Association (AAA).88 The justice next quoted passages
from New Jersey's Arbitration Act (Arbitration Act) 89 relating to
confirmation of and reasons for vacating an arbitration award.90
The court conceded that the Arbitration Act did not explicitly
state a mistake of law or insufficiency of the evidence as reasons for
vacating an award.9 1 Nonetheless, the court affirmed the invalidity
of an arbitration award unsupported by the evidence.9 2
Next, the court acknowledged the inconsistent case law dealing with judicial review of arbitrators' mistakes of law.9" The court
129 N.J. 479, 610 A.2d 364 (1992).
See supra notes 8-16 and accompanying text (discussing the many standards of
review from which the New Jersey Supreme Court could choose).
87 Perini,129 N.J. at 489, 610 A.2d at 369. For a brief overview of the New Jersey
courts' stance on arbitration, see Editorial Note, supra note 7, at 159 & n.92.
88 Perini, 129 N.J. at 490, 610 A.2d at 369. The justice pointed out that parties have
the option of agreeing to procedures set out by the American Arbitration Association
(AAA) or any other procedure. Id. In the present case, the justice stated that the
parties chose "to follow the Construction Industry Arbitration rules of the AAA." Id.
The justice then quoted: "[t ] he arbitrator may grant any remedy or relief which is just
and equitable within the terms of the agreement of the parties." Id. at 490-91, 610
A.2d at 369.
89 NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2A:24-1 to -11 (West 1952).
90 Perini, 129 N.J. at 491, 610 A.2d at 369-70 (citing N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:24-7 (West
1952) and quoting NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2A:24-8 (West 1952)). Section 2A:24-8(d), the
"exceeded their powers" provision, requires a court to vacate an award "[wI]here the
arbitrators exceeded or so imperfectly executed their powers that a mutual, final and
definite award upon the subject matter submitted was not made." N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 2A: 24-8(d) (West 1952). Section 24A:24-7, the provision governing confirmation of
arbitral awards, provides: 'A party to the arbitration may, within 3 months after the
award is delivered to him, unless the parties shall extend the time in writing, commence a summary action in the court aforesaid for the confirmation of the award or
for its vacation, modification or correction." N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:24-7 (West 1952).
91 Perini, 129 N.J, at 491, 610 A.2d at 370.
92 Id. (citing McHugh Inc. v. Soldo Constr. Co., 238 NJ. Super. 141, 147, 569 A.2d
293, 295 (App. Div. 1990)). The standard set forth in Perini was later used in In re
Tretina Printing,Inc. In reTretina Printing, Inc. v. Fitzpatrick & Assocs., 262 N.J. Super.
45, 51, 619 A.2d 1037, 1040 (App. Div. 1993) (citation omitted). See also NF&M Corp.
v. United Steelworkers of Am., 524 F.2d 756, 760 (3d Cir. 1975) (holding that an
award may be vacated where it is bereft of any support for the arbitrator's determinations) (citation omitted).
93 Perini, 129 N.J. at 491, 610 A.2d at 370; see also Ukrainian Nat'l Urban Renewal
Corp. v. Muscarelle, Inc., 151 NJ. Super. 386, 400, 376 A2d 1299, 1306 (App. Div.)
85
86
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first discussed various ways in which "undue means" would occur
and, therefore, justify vacation.9 4 Justice O'Hern then referred to
differing case law in which some courts categorized a mistake of
law under the "undue means" provision in the Arbitration Act. 95
The justice also pointed to courts that had categorized mistakes of
(further noting that various courts have interpreted the phrase "undue means" differently over time) (citation omitted), certif. denied, 75 NJ. 529, 384 A.2d 509 (1977); Bell
v. Price, 23 NJ. Eq. 578, 584 (Ch. 1849) (noting that American courts treat an arbitrator's power to decide questions of law and/or fact inconsistently depending on the
unique customs or practices of that particular jurisdiction).
94 Perini, 129 NJ. at 491-93, 610 A.2d at 370-71.
95 Id. (citations omitted). Specifically, Justice O'Hern cited Perez v. American Bankers InsuranceCo. as the only NewJersey Supreme Court case to equate a mistake of law
with undue means. Id. at 492, 610 A.2d at 370 (citing Perez v. American Bankers Ins.
Co., 81 NJ. 415, 420, 409 A.2d 269, 271 (1979)). But see Atlantic City v. Laezza, 80 N.J.
255, 269, 403 A.2d 465, 472 (1979) (stating that an arbitrator's failure to consider the
town's law in rendering an award would constitute a violation of the "undue means"
provision).
Several lower courts adopted the Perez interpretation of undue means both prior
to and subsequent to the Perez decision. See, e.g., In re Arbitration Between Grover, 80
N.J. 221, 230-31, 403 A.2d 448, 453 (1979) (stating that where the parties set forth
certain terms and conditions to be satisfied and the arbitrator disregarded those
terms, the award was procured by a mistake of law or "undue means"); Jersey City
Educ. Ass'n v. Board of Educ., 218 NJ. Super. 177, 188, 527 A.2d 84, 90 (App. Div.
1987) (arguing that an arbitrator's actions may constitute "undue means" by failing to
follow the law) (citation omitted); Selected Risks Ins. Co. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 179 NJ.
Super. 444, 451, 432 A.2d 544, 548 (App. Div. 1981) (arguing that a mistake of law
constitutes undue means in the private sector context) (citation omitted), certif. denied, 88 NJ. 489, 443 A.2d 705 (1981); Local Union 560, I.B.T. v. Eazor Express Inc.,
95 NJ. Super. 219, 227-28, 230 A.2d 521, 525 (App. Div. 1967) (proposing that only a
clearly mistaken view of fact or law would constitute "undue means") (citation omitted); Held v. Comfort Bus Line, Inc., 136 NJ.L. 640, 642, 57 A.2d 20, 22 (1948) (ruling that "undue means" contemplates an arbitrator's mistake of law or fact that results
in failure of intent).
Certain jurisdictions, however, have chosen to equate the phrase "undue means"
with terms equivalent to fraud and corruption. See, e.g., Drayer v. Krasner, 572 F.2d
348, 352 (2d Cir. 1978) (qualifying undue means as being partial or misbehaving)
(citing San Martine Compania De Navegacion v. Saguenay Terminals Ltd., 293 F.2d
796), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 948 (1978)); Shearson Hayden Stone, Inc. v. Liang, 493 F.
Supp. 104, 108 (N.D. Ill. 1980) (defining "undue means" under § 1OA of the Arbitration Act as requiring the award to have been rendered by "some type of bad faith")
(citations omitted), affd, 653 F.2d 310 (7th Cir. 1981); Arkansas Dep't of Parks &
Tourism v. Resort Managers, Inc., 743 S.W.2d 389, 391 (Ark. 1988) (defining the
phrase "undue means," as found in the Arkansas arbitration statute, as exceeding a
mere inappropriateness or inadequacy of the evidence, but confining applicability of
the standard to unfairness in the arbitration proceeding or conduct specifically outlined in the arbitration act) (citation omitted).
Other courts, however, have defined the phrase "undue means" differently. See,
e.g., A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc. v. McCollough, 967 F.2d 1401, 1403 (9th Cir. 1992),
(defining the term "undue" as "behavior that is immoral if not illegal") (quoting
BLACK'S LAw DIMrIONARY 1697 (4th ed. 1951)), cert. denied, 113 S.Ct. 970 (1993); see
also San Martine, 293 F.2d at 801 (applying a "manifest infidelity" standard to the "undue means" phrase in a federal arbitration statute); Editorial Note, supra note 7, at
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law under the Arbitration Act's "exceeded their powers" provision. 96 The New Jersey Supreme Court disagreed, however, with
180-81 & nn.233-41 (describing undue means as a palpable mistake appearing on the
face of the award, which if shown to the arbitrator would be admitted as a mistake).
96 Perin 129 NJ. at 492-93, 610 A.2d at 370 (revealing that both the "undue
means" and the "exceeds their powers" provisions were used as grounds to vacate an
award because the arbitrator had failed to follow the law) (citation omitted); see also
Faherty v. Faherty, 97 NJ. 99, 112-13, 477 A.2d 1257, 1264 (1984) (holding that where
the parties agreed that the arbitrator would decide legal issues in accordance with
New Jersey law, the part of the award that violated the law was vacated because the
arbitrator exceeded his power under the statute); Smith v. Motorland Ins. Co., 352
N.W.2d 335, 337 (Mich. Ct. App. 1984) (explaining that the "excess power" provision
included the situation where the arbitrator acted "in contravention" of the law) (citation omitted). But see Farkas v. Receivable Fin. Corp., 806 F. Supp. 84, 87 (E.D. Va.
1992) (refusing to vacate an award under the "excess of power" provision for a misinterpretation of a contract or a legal error) (citations omitted); Schnurmacher Holding, Inc. v. Noriega, 542 So. 2d 1327, 1329 (Fla. 1989) (declining to interpret the
"excess of power" provision as encompassing a legal error but instead defining the
standard as the arbitrator's "go [ing] beyond the authority granted by the parties or the
operative documents and decid[ing] an issue not pertinent to the resolution of the
issue submitted to arbitration") (citation omitted); Detroit Auto. Inter-Ins. Exch. v.
Gavin, 331 N.W.2d 418, 436 (Mich. 1982) (Levin, J., concurring) (stating that the
interpretation of the "excess of power" provision had not previously incorporated an
arbitrator's decision contrary to a judicial decision that a court would make) (footnote omitted); Turner v. Nicholson Properties, Inc., 341 S.E.2d 42, 45 (N.C. Ct. App.
1986) (declining to place a legal error under the "excess of power" provision for fear
that the general rule of refusing to vacate an award for legal error would then be
easily circumvented) (citations omitted); Batten v. Howell, 389 S.E.2d 170, 172 (S.C.
Ct. App. 1990) (stating that a legal error was not considered an "excess of power").
Various courts have defined the "exceeds their powers" provision in somewhat
different terms. See, e.g., Pennsylvania Power Co. v. Local Union No. 272, IBEW, 886
F.2d 46, 48 (3d Cir. 1989) (defining an excess of arbitral authority as an arbitrator's
disregard of the parties' agreement, substituting instead the arbitrator's own "notions
of industrial justice") (citing United Steelworkers of Am. v. Enterprise Wheel & Car
Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 597 (1960)); Davis v. Chevy Chase Fin. Ltd., 667 F.2d 160, 165,
168 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (vacating an award under the "exceeding powers" provision
when arbitrators granted relief not contemplated by the arbitration clause); National
R.R1 Passenger v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry., 551 F.2d 136, 142 (7th Cir. 1977) (agreeing
with other courts that an arbitrator's misconstruction of a contract does not constitute
an excess of power); County College of Morris Staff v. County College of Morris, 100
N.J. 383, 391, 495 A.2d 865, 869 (1985) (holding that an excess of power occurred
when the arbitrator ignored the authority mandated by the terms of the contract);
Selected Risks, 179 N.J. Super. at 451, 432 A.2d at 548 (App. Div.) (discussing actions
that satisfy the excess power provision); UkrainianNat'l Urban Renewal 151 N.J. Super.
at 398, 376 A.2d at 1305 (applying the "exceeds-their-powers" test of N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 2A:24-8(d) to situations in which the arbitrability of a dispute was in question by
looking to the contractual language for resolution) (quoting Standard Oil, Dev. Co.
Employees Union v. Esso Research Eng'g Co., 38 N.J. Super. 106, 119, 118 A.2d 70, 77
(App. Div. 1955)), certif, denied, 75 N.J. 529, 384 A.2d 509 (1977).
Otherjurisdictions have cautioned against concluding too quickly that an arbitrator acted in excess of power. See, e.g., Western Iowa Pork Co. v. National Bhd. Packaginghouse Workers, Local 52, 366 F.2d 275, 277 (8th Cir. 1966) (noting that in

instances of a possible excess of authority, an arbitrator, who derived his powers from
the terms of the agreement, was awarded the benefit of the doubt) (citations omit-
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those courts' placement of the mistake of law only within the two

classifications.97 Rather, the court declared that because an arbitrator's authority is derived solely from the parties' intent, an arbitrator is required to resolve the matter in accordance with the
parties' instructions.98 Justice O'Hem qualified this statement by
remarking that arbitrators are not considered judges,99 and that
ted); Textile Workers Union of Am., Local 1386 v. American Thread Co., 291 F.2d
894, 906 (4th Cir. 1961) (SobeloffJ., dissenting) (stating that in reviewing arbitration
awards, courts delegate the burden of proving an excess of an arbitrator's power on
the party attacking the award) (footnote omitted); Rauh v. Rockford Prods. Corp.,
574 N.E.2d 636, 641 (Ill. 1991) (affording arbitrators a presumption that there was no
excess of authority where an award is challenged under an Illinois statute containing
an excess of power provision) (citation omitted). But see Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen for St. Louis Southwestern Ry. v. St. Louis Southwestern Ry., 220 F. Supp. 319,
325 (E.D. Tx. 1963) (refusing to reverse an arbitrator's award even though an inference could have been drawn that the arbitrator exceeded authority), cert. denied, 396
U.S. 1008 (1970).
97 Perini, 129 NJ. at 493, 610 A.2d at 371.
98 Id. (citing Kearny PBA Local 21 v. Kearny, 81 N.J. 208, 217, 405 A.2d 393, 398
(1979)).
99 Id. This statement, however, stands in sharp contrast to earlier judicial observations that arbitrators were the parties' private or chosen judges of both law and fact.
Levine v. Wiss & Co., 97 N.J. 242, 250, 478 A.2d 397, 401 (1984) (citation omitted);
UkrainianNat'l Urban Renewa4 151 N.J. Super. at 396, 376 A.2d at 1304 (citations omitted); Melvin P. Windsor, Inc. v. Mayflower Say. & Loan, Ass'n, 115 N.J. Super. 219,
220, 278 A.2d 547, 547-48 (App. Div. 1971) (citation omitted); Harsen v. Board of
Educ., 132 N.J. Super. 365, 371, 333 A.2d 580, 583 (Law Div. 1975); Daly v. KomlineSanderson Eng'g Corp., 40 N.J. 175, 178, 191 A.2d 37, 38 (1963); Sonotone Corp. v.
Hayes, 2 N.J. Super. 407, 411, 64 A.2d 249, 250 (Ch. Div.) (citations omitted), rev'd on
other grounds, 4 N.J. Super. 326, 67 A.2d 184 (App. Div. 1949); Ruckman v. Ransom, 23
N.J. Eq. 118, 120 (Ch. 1872); Moore v. Ewing & Bowen, Ex'rs, 1 N.J.L. 167, 173
(1792); see also In re Arbitration Between Grover, 80 N.J. 221, 234, 403 A.2d 448, 455
(1979) (Pashman, J., dissenting) (stating that an arbitrator becomes an absolute
judge over all submitted matters and, as such, "may do what no other judge has a
right to do; he may intentionally decide contrary to law and still have his judgment
stand") (citation omitted). But see id. at 224, 230-31, 403 A.2d at 450, 453 (setting
aside an award upon discovery that the arbitrator made a mistake of law in interpreting an insurance policy).
Similarly, the court in FredJ. Brotherton, Inc. v. Kreielsheimernoted that "[a] n arbitrator acts in a quasi-judicial capacity and must render a faithful, honest and disinterested opinion upon the testimony submitted to him." Fred J. Brotherton, Inc. v.
Kreielsheimer, 8 N.J. 66, 70, 83 A.2d 707, 709 (1951); cf Levine, 97 N.J. at 248-50, 478
A.2d at 400-01 (holding that because arbitration can be considered a quasi-judicial
proceeding, a decision rendered under it should be treated the equivalent of a verdict). But see Newark Stereotypers' Union No. 18 v. Newark Morning Ledger Co., 397
F.2d 594, 598 (3d Cir. 1968) (observing that the United States Arbitration Act
changed the common law notion that arbitrators act as the sole judges of both fact
and law) (citation omitted), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 954 (1968).
Other jurisdictions have agreed with the Brotherton court as to the finality of an
arbitrator's decision. Mandich v. Watters, 970 F.2d 462, 466 (8th Cir. 1992) (citation
omitted); San Martine Compania De Navegacion v. Saguenay Terminals Ltd., 293
F.2d 796, 800 (9th Cir. 1961); The Hartbridge v. Munson S.S. Line, 62 F.2d 72, 73 (2d
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their decisions, therefore, are not subject to the same degree of
supervision as those of a judge. 10 0
The main issue, Justice O'Hern explained, was the scope of
judicial review over an arbitrator's decision. 10 Reciting the "reasonably debatable" standard used in the public sector, 0 2 the court
03
encouraged the adoption of this standard for the private sector.1
The justice further opined that the courts must go beyond a search
for "mere mistakes of law."' 0 4 In so doing, the court recalled the
Held standard,' which confirmed an arbitration award where the
arbitrators clearly intended to follow the law, but mistook the law,
Cir. 1932), cert. denied sub nom. Munson S.S. Line v. Harbridge, 288 U.S. 601 (1933);
Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co. v. Deitrich, 803 F. Supp. 1032, 1038 (M.D. Pa. 1992).
100 Perini, 129 NJ. at 493, 610 A.2d at 371. But see Hoagland v. Veghte, 3 NJ.L. 92,
94 (1851) (stating that because the parties choose their arbitrators, the parties may
not appeal the arbitrators' judgment) (citation omitted).
101 Penni, 129 N.J. at 493, 610 A.2d at 371.
102 Id. (citing Kearny PBA Local No. 21 v. Kearny, 81 N.J. 208, 221, 405 A.2d 393,
399-400 (1979)); see Division 540, Amalgamated Transit Union, v. Mercer County Improvement Auth., 76 N.J. 245, 252, 386 A.2d 1290, 1294 (1978) (describing the expansive use of arbitration in the public sector); see also United States Postal Serv. v.
National Ass'n of Letter Carriers, 839 F.2d 146, 150 (3d Cir. 1988) (holding that with
regard to judicial review of arbitration conducted under collective bargaining agreements, there was no distinction between the postal service and the private sector despite the fact that the postal service was a public employer).
103 Perini, 129 N.J. at 493, 610 A.2d at 371. Other NewJersey courts have similarly
employed the "reasonably debatable" standard. County College of Morris Staff v.
County College of Morris, 100 N.J. 383, 390-91, 495 A.2d 865, 869 (1985) (citation
omitted); D'Arrigo v. State Bd. of Mediation, 228 N.J. Super. 189, 196, 549 A.2d 451,
454 (App. Div. 1988) (citation omitted), rev'd, 119 NJ. 74, 574 A.2d 44 (1990); Selected Risks Ins. Co. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 179 N.J. Super. 444, 451, 432 A.2d 544, 548
(App. Div.) (citation omitted), certif. denied, 88 NJ. 489, 443 A.2d 705 (1981). The
court in Ukrainian National Urban Renewal Corp. v. Muscarele, Inc. additionally stated
that "where the agreement provides for arbitration of disputes over contractual language, and a debatable question exists, the reviewing court is bound by the arbitrators' decision." UkrainianNat'l Urban Renewal 151 N.J. Super. at 398, 376 A.2d at 1305
(citations omitted).
Federal courts have also discussed either the "reasonably debatable" standard or
an equivalent standard. See Exxon Shipping Co. v. Exxon Seamen's Union, 788 F.
Supp. 829, 834 (D.NJ. 1992) (enforcing an arbitration award containing a serious
error so long as the contract was "arguably" construed) (citation omitted), aftd, 993
F.2d 357 (3d Cir. 1993); cf.lerna v. Arthur Murray Int'l., Inc., 833 F.2d 1472, 1476-77
(11th Cir. 1987) (upholding an award that was merely reasonable).
104 Perin 129 N.J. at 494, 610 A.2d at 371; see also Held v. Comfort Bus Line, Inc.,
136 N.J.L. 640, 642,57 A.2d 20, 22 (1948) (ruling that "[o]rdinarily, a mistake or error
of law or fact is not fatal"); WestJersey R.R. v. Thomas, 21 N.J. Eq. 431, 433 (Ch. 1873)
(refusing to set aside an award for legal error). But see D 'Arigo,228 N.J. Super. at 196,
549 A.2d at 454 (vacating for legal error) (citations omitted); Selected Risks, 179 N.J.
Super. at 451, 432 A.2d at 548.
105 For a discussion of the Held standard, see supra notes 58-61 and accompanying
text.
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10 6
and where the mistake was apparent on the face of the award.
The court later noted that an arbitrator's award should similarly
not be vacated even for a gross error of law 0 7 unless the award
suggested fraud or misconduct.1 0 8
Justice O'Hern then discussed the grounds upon which other
jurisdictions relied in refusing to vacate an award. 0 ' The justice
observed other courts' holdings that the award would be vacated
only if the arbitrator misapplied the law. 1 10 Justice O'Hern noted,
however, several other exceptions to this rule, which included vacating an award due to irrationality,'1 1 contrariness to public pol-

106 Perini, 129 N.J. at 371, 610 A.2d at 494 (citation omitted). The Held case was the
landmark decision for reversing an award where the arbitrators intended to follow the
law, but failed, and made the mistake apparent on the face of the award. Held, 136
N.J.L. at 640, 57 A.2d at 20. Since Held, many NewJersey courts have either implicitly
or explicitly adopted the Held standard. See Local No. 153 Office & Professional Employees Int'l Union v. Trust Co., 105 N.J. 442, 450 n.1, 522 A.2d 992, 996 n.1 (1987);
Local Union 560, I.B.T. v. Eazor Express, Inc., 95 N.J. Super. 219, 227-28, 230 A.2d
521, 525 (App. Div. 1967); Anco Prods. Corp. v. T V Prods. Corp., 23 N.J. Super. 116,
124, 92 A.2d 625, 629 (App. Div. 1952); WilliamJ. Burns Int'l Detective Agency, Inc. v.
New Jersey Guards Union, Inc., 64 N.J. Super. 301, 312, 165 A.2d 844, 849 (App. Div.
1960) (citations omitted), certif. denied, 34 N.J. 464, 169 A.2d 742 (1961); Carpenter v.
Bloomer, 54 N.J. Super. 157, 168, 148 A.2d 497, 503 (App. Div. 1959); Harsen v.
Board of Educ., 132 N.J. Super. 365, 371-72, 333 A.2d 580, 584 (Law Div. 1975) (citation omitted); Tave Constr. Co. v. Wiesenfeld, 82 N.J. Super. 562, 567, 198 A.2d 486,
488-89 (Ch. Div. 1964) (citation omitted), affld, 90 N.J. Super. 244, 217 A.2d 140
(App. Div.), certif denied, 47 N.J. 84, 219 A.2d 419 (1966); International Ass'n of Machinists, Lodge 1292 v. Bergen Ave. Business Owners Ass'n, 3 N.J. Super. 558, 566, 67
A.2d 362, 367 (Law Div. 1949) (citation omitted).
Courts before Held had expressed a similar principle but were not credited for
the proposition. See Caparaso v. Durante, 132 NJ.L. 16, 16-17, 38 A.2d 133, 134
(1944), affd, 132 N.J.L. 419, 40 A.2d 649 (1945); Deakman v. Odd Fellows Hall Ass'n
ofJersey City, Inc., 110 N.J.L. 304, 306, 164 A. 256, 257 (1933); Hoboken Mfrs. R.R. v.
Hoboken R.R. Warehouse & Steamship Connecting Co., 132 N.J. Eq. 111, 118-19, 27
A.2d 150, 154 (Ch. 1942), affd, 133 N.J. Eq. 270, 31 A.2d 801 (1943); Leslie v. Leslie,
50 N.J. Eq. 103, 107-08, 24 A. 319, 320 (Ch. 1892).
107 Perini, 129 N.J. at 494, 610 A.2d at 371. At least one court had adopted this
"gross" error standard prior to Perini. See Ruckman v. Ransom, 23 N.J. Eq. 118, 120
(Ch. 1872) (refusing to disturb an arbitrator's judgment "except upon very cogent
reasons"). Other NewJersey courts, however, have vacated an award for even a palpable or material mistake of law. See Brooks v. Pennsylvania Mfrs. Ass'n Ins., 121 N.J.
Super. 51, 55, 296 A.2d 72, 74 (App. Div. 1972) (citation omitted), modified on other
grounds, 62 N.J. 583, 303 A.2d 884 (1973); Collingswood Hosiery Mills, Inc. v. American Fed'n of Hosiery Workers, 31 N.J. Super. 466, 471, 107 A.2d 43, 45 (App. Div.
1954); Hoboken Mfrs. RR, 132 N.J. Eq. at 118, 27 A.2d at 154 (citations omitted);
Eastern Eng'g Co. v. City of Ocean City, 11 N.J. Misc. 508, 512, 167 A. 522, 523 (Sup.
Ct. 1933).
108 Perini, 129 N.J. at 494, 610 A.2d at 371.
109 Id. at 494-96, 610 A.2d at 371-73 (citations omitted).
110 Id. at 494, 610 A.2d at 371 (citation omitted).

Ill Id.; see lerna v. Arthur Murray Int'l, Inc., 833 F.2d 1472, 1476-77 (lth Cir.
1987); French v. Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 784 F.2d 902, 906 (9th Cir.
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and abuse of the arbitrator's power. 1 i Further, the court
distinguished the federal standard that allowed for vacation of an
award only where an arbitrator displayed a "manifest disregard" of
the law. 1 4 Recognizing the limited nature ofjudicial review, 115 the
icy, 112

1986); National Post Office Mailhandlers Union v. United States Postal Serv., 751 F.2d
834, 840 (6th Cir. 1985); Arco-Polymers, Inc. v. Local 8-74, 671 F.2d 752, 757-58 (3d
Cir. 1982); Detroit Coil Co. v. International Ass'n of Machinists Workers, Lodge 82,
594 F.2d 575, 579 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 840 (1979); In re Arbitration Between Marcy Lee Mfg. Co. v. Cortley Fabrics Co., 354 F.2d 42, 43 (2d Cir. 1965); In re
Harris, 140 N.J. Super. 10, 15, 354 A.2d 704, 707 (App. Div. 1976); Lentine v.
Fundaro, 278 N.E.2d 633, 634 (N.Y. 1972).
The Supreme Court of Kansas has advanced a similar doctrine relating to the
revision rather than the vacation of an award. Jackson Trak Group, Inc. v. Mid States
Port Auth., 751 P.2d 122, 127 (Kan. 1988) (refusing to revise the award unless the
award was "tainted" or the contract was irrationally interpreted) (citations omitted).
112 Perini, 129 N.J. at 494, 610 A.2d at 371; see, e.g., Iowa Elec. Light & Power Co. v.
Local 204, IBEW, 834 F.2d 1424, 1427 (8th Cir. 1987) (refusing to enforce an award
violative of public policy) (citation omitted); Exxon Shipping Co. v. Exxon Seamen's
Union, 788 F. Supp. 829, 837 (D.N.J. 1992) (refusing to enforce an award violative of
public policy) (citation omitted), af'd, 993 F.2d 357 (3d Cir. 1993); Union Pacific
RR. v. United Transp. Union, 794 F. Supp. 891, 894 (D. Neb. 1992) (observing that "a
court need not, in fact, cannot enforce an award that violates public policy") (citation
omitted).
For a general discussion of arbitrability and public policy in other jurisdictions
such as Argentina, England, France, and Belgium, see Relaxation, supra note 38, at
1680-87.
"13 Perini, 129 N.J. at 494, 610 A.2d at 371 (citation omitted); see Belardinelli v.
Werner Continental, Inc., 128 N.J. Super. 1, 7, 318 A.2d 777, 780 (App. Div. 1974)
(noting that where an arbitrator's award has no basis in fact or reason, the arbitrator
has exceeded his/her power) (quoting Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Central of
Ga. Ry., 415 F.2d 403, 411-12 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1008 (1970)).
114 Perini, 129 N.J. at 495-96, 610 A.2d at 372 (citations omitted). See Shearson Hayden Stone, Inc. v. Liang, 493 F. Supp. 104, 108 (N.D. Ill. 1980), afid, 653 F.2d 310
(7th Cir. 1981) (equating "manifest disregard of the law" with "fundamentally irrational" and defining both as the arbitrator's failure to decide according to legal principles and not a mistaken legal interpretation); San Martine Compania De
Navegacion, S.A. v. Saguenay Terminals Ltd., 293 F.2d 796, 801 n.4 (9th Cir. 1961)
(defining manifest disregard of the law as "something beyond and different from a
mere error in the law or failure on the part of the arbitrators to understand or apply
the law"). For a discussion of actions that do not constitute "manifest disregard" of
the law, see Local Joint Executive Bd. of Las Vegas v. Riverboat Casino, Inc., 817 F.2d
524, 528 (9th Cir. 1987) (holding that the arbitrators did not manifestly disregard the
law by applying different common law principles). For other cases that use the "manifest disregard" language in reference to the parties' agreement, rather than the law as
a basis for disturbing an award, see News America Publications, Inc. v. Newark Typographical Union, Local 103, 918 F.2d 21, 24 (3d Cir. 1990) ("News America Publications I") (quotation omitted); General Tel. Co. v. Communications Workers of
America, 648 F.2d 452, 457 (6th Cir. 1981) (citation omitted); In re Arbitration Between Silverman and Benmor Coats, 461 N.E.2d 1261, 1266 (N.Y. 1984) (citations
omitted); In re Arbitration Between Grover, 80 N.J. 221, 230, 403 A.2d 448, 453
(1979). Similarly, the court in Amicizia Societa Navegacione v. Chilean Nitrate & Iodine
Sales Corp. held that a misapplication of a contract did not constitute manifest disregard of the law. Amicizia Societa Navegacione v. Chilean Nitrate & Iodine Sales Corp.,
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justice insisted that the court's function was to protect only against
an interpretive error that could be characterized as unmistakable,
gross, undebatable, or in a manifest disregard of the applicable law
leading to an unjust result. 16
The court concluded its discussion of the arbitration issues by
challenging ChiefJustice Wilentz's concurring view that the plurality was maintaining an "anti-arbitration bias."' 1 7 According to the
court, the chief justice's assertion of a limited amount of judicial
review of arbitrators' awards would not weaken the arbitration system." 8 Rather, the court declared that the public would lose faith
in the arbitration system if an award expressly violating New Jersey
law and policy was upheld." 9 Thus, the court affirmed the appellate division's holding by refusing to vacate the arbitration award
absent any gross or undebatable error, or manifest disregard of the
20

law.1

Chief Justice Wilentz presented a forceful, yet eloquent concurrence,12 1 which explored the possible ramifications that the plu274 F.2d 805, 808 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 363 U.S. 843 (1960). Furthermore, Judge
Oakes, writing for the Second Circuit in I/S Stavborg v. NationalMetal Converters, Inc.,
explained that the Supreme Court in Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of America "negated
the possibility of applying a nonstatutory, 'manifest disregard' standard to a case"
when the Court stated that "[w]hether the arbitrators misconstrued a contract is not
open to judicial review." I/S Stavborg v. National Metal Converters, Inc., 500 F.2d
424, 431 (2d Cir. 1974) (citing Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of Am., 350 U.S. 198, 203
n.4 (1956)) (further citation omitted).
115 Perini, 129 N.J. at 496, 610 A.2d at 372 (citation omitted). This articulation was
consistent with the NewJersey courts' practice of limitingjudicial review of arbitration
awards. Levine v. Wiss & Co., 97 N.J. 242, 250, 478 A.2d 397, 401 (1984) (quoting
Barcon Assocs. v. Tri-County Asphalt Corp., 86 N.J. 179, 187, 430 A.2d 214, 218
(1981)); Elberon Bathing Co. v. Ambassador Ins. Co., 77 N.J. 1, 17, 389 A.2d 439, 446
(1978) (citations omitted); McHugh Inc. v. Soldo Constr. Co., 238 N.J. Super. 141,
144, 569 A.2d 293, 294 (App. Div. 1990). Narrow review has also been extended to
labor arbitration cases. Local Union 560, I.B.T. v. Eazor Express, Inc., 95 N.J. Super.
219, 227, 230 A.2d 521, 525 (App. Div. 1967) (citation omitted).
116 Perini, 129 N.J. at 496, 610 A.2d at 372-73.
117 Id. at 496-97, 610 A.2d at 373.
118 Id. at 497, 610 A.2d at 373.
119 Id. But see Barcon Assocs., 86 N.J. at 210, 430 A.2d at 230 (Clifford, J., dissenting)
(stating that the public policy of encouraging arbitration as a viable, alternative
method of dispute resolution outweighs any consideration of maintaining public confidence in the process) (citations omitted).
120 Perini, 129 N.J. at 493, 610 A.2d at 371.
121 See Edgar H. Brenner, Speech at the American Bar Association Annual Meeting
in a seminar presented by the ABA Arbitration Committee, entitled East Coast or West
Coast and Eveywhere in Between: Should ArbitrationAwards be Reviewed to Correct Errors of
Law That Lead to an "Unjust"Result? (Aug. 11, 1993) (excerpts available from the Seton
Hall Law Review) (praising the ChiefJustice's comprehensive analysis of the plurality's
opinion). ChiefJustice Wilentz has, over the years, been found on both sides of decisions involving confirmation of arbitration awards. See, e.g., Local 153, Office & Pro-

1024

SETON HALL LAW REVEW

[Vol. 24:998

rality's decision would have on the interplay between arbitration
and the court system.12 2 Initially, the concurrence forewarned that
the plurality's holding would result in arbitration becoming a first
step to lengthy litigation. 12' The chief justice argued for the overhaul of prior precedents that allowed for judicial review in the case
of arbitral error. 2 4 The chief justice proposed that the standard
1 25
for review should simply be whether the arbitrator was honest,
fessional Employees Int'l Union v. Trust Co., 105 NJ. 442, 453, 522 A.2d 992, 997
(1987) (joining the court in upholding the award); County College of Morris Staff v.
County College of Morris, 100 NJ. 383, 399-407, 495 A.2d 865, 873-78 (1985) (Wilentz, C.J., dissenting) (dissenting from the majority's decision to reverse an arbitrators' award); Faherty v. Faherty, 97 N.J. 99, 112-13, 477 A.2d 1257, 1264-65 (1984)
(agreeing to vacate part of an award under the excess of power provision because the
parties intended, but the arbitrator failed, to follow the law); Communications Workers of Am., Local 1087 v. Monmouth County Bd. of Social Servs., 96 N.J. 442, 452, 453,
456, 476 A.2d 777, 781, 782, 783-84 (1984) (joining a unanimous decision to vacate a
public sector award where the arbitrator did not follow the law); NewJersey, Dep't of
Law & Pub. Safety v. State Fraternal Ass'n of NewJersey, Inc., 91 N.J. 464, 471-72, 475,
453 A.2d 176, 180, 182 (1982) (joining with the majority in reversing an award partly
because the arbitrator's interpretation was not "reasonably debatable"); Barcon Assocs.,
86 N.J. at 200, 206, 216, 430 A.2d at 224, 228, 233 (Clifford, J., dissenting) (joining
dissentingJustices Clifford and Schreiber in reversing the appellate division's decision
to vacate on grounds of partiality); Perez v. American Bankers Ins. Co., 81 N.J. 415,
420, 421, 409 A.2d 269, 271, 272 (1979) (participating in this decision in which the
court unanimously identified a mistake of law as grounds for vacating an award under
the "undue means" provision) (citation omitted). In County College of Morris Staff,
Chief Justice Wilentz remarked:
The Court has.., forgotten the rule that requires us to give great deference to arbitration, a deference that necessarily includes a sympathetic
rather than a hostile reading of the arbitrator's opinion. Today's decision is an unfortunate exception to this Court's recognition of the desirability of arbitration in labor relations and of the superior wisdom and
experience of arbitrators in determining disputes in that field.
County College of Morris Staff, 100 NJ. at 406-07, 495 A.2d at 878.
122 Perini, 129 NJ. at 519, 610 A.2d at 384 (Wilentz, C.J., concurring).
123 Id. at 518-19, 610 A.2d at 384 (Wilentz, CJ., concurring). Other courts have
articulated this fear when arbitrators' awards were freely vacated. See, e.g., Burchell v.
Marsh, 17 U.S. (1 How.) 344, 349 (1854) (explaining that where a court vacated an
award that was made after a fair hearing, the vacation would become the beginning,
rather than the end of litigation); see also In re Arbitration Between Grover, 80 NJ.
221, 235, 403 A.2d 448, 455 (1979) (Pashman,J., dissenting) (expressing the need for
limited judicial review to avert the potential for prolonged litigation) (citations omitted); Richard H. Steen, Steps to Avoid Construction Contract Problems, 135 NJ. L.J. 742,
760 (Oct. 18, 1993) (noting that many attorneys agree with the possibility that the
plurality's decision in Perini may increase post-arbitration litigation).
124 Perini, 129 N.J. at 519, 610 A.2d at 384 (Wilentz, C.J., concurring).
125 Id. at 519, 529, 610 A.2d at 384, 389 (Wilentz, CJ., concurring). For other New
Jersey cases supporting an "honesty" standard, see Brooks v. Pennsylvania Mfrs. Ass'n
Ins., 121 N.J. Super. 51, 55, 296 A.2d 72, 74 (App. Div. 1972), modified on othergrounds,
62 N.J. 583, 303 A.2d 884 (1973) (per curiam) (refusing to vacate an award where the
arbitrator decided a case according to a personal notion of what was right and just,
rather than the law) (citation omitted); WilliamJ. Burns Int'l Detective Agency v. New
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and whether his or her decision remained restricted to the terms
12 6
of the agreement.
Next, the chiefjustice faulted the Held decision 12 7 for its hostility to precedents that had generally refused to vacate an arbitration
award.1 28 Chief Justice Wilentz then criticized Brooks for improperly expanding judicial review of arbitration awards where the
arbi12 9
trator had intended to follow the law but made a mistake.
The concurrence surveyed the law of other jurisdictions and
found that New Jersey had adopted the minority position as to the
standard of judicial review of arbitration awards.1 " The chief justice then launched into a lengthy discussion of the plurality's rule,
classifying the rule as both "unworkable" and "unjustifiable."3 1
Chief Justice Wilentz disagreed with the plurality's standard because the rule wrongly focused on the arbitrator's intent and the
arbitrator's expressions of that intent.13 2 Instead, the chief justice
insisted that the focus should be on the parties' intent in having the
arbitrators resolve the dispute and on what standard the litigants
wished to 3be considered during judicial review of the arbitrator's
3
decision.1
Chief Justice Wilentz also strongly denounced the plurality's
decision to vacate an award that contained a "gross error" because
Jersey Guards Union, 64 N.J. Super. 301, 312-13, 165 A.2d 844, 849 (App. Div. 1960)
(citation omitted) (recognizing that by submitting their dispute to arbitration, the
parties had implicitly agreed to allow the arbitrator to balance the equities in achieving a fair outcome), certif denied, 34 N.J. 464, 169 A.2d 742 (1961); Eastern Eng'g Co.
v. Ocean City, 11 N.J. Misc. 508, 511, 167 A. 522, 523 (Sup. Ct. 1933) (categorizing an
award rendered by an upright and impartial arbitrator who did not exceed his authority as "unimpeachable" and "irreversible"); Leslie v. Leslie, 50 N.J. Eq. 103, 107, 24 A.
319, 320 (Ch. 1892) (upholding an award fairly rendered); Ruckman v. Ransom, 23
N.J. Eq. 118, 120 (Ch. 1872) (stating that an arbitrator could render an award based
on a personal sense of good conscience and was not bound to base a decision solely
on legal grounds).
126 Perini, 129 N.J. at 519, 610 A.2d at 384 (Wilentz, C.J., concurring).
127 See supra notes 56-61 and accompanying text (discussing the Held case).
128 Perini, 129 N.J. at 520-21, 610 A.2d at 385 (Wilentz, C.J., concurring).
129 Id. at 522, 610 A.2d at 386 (Wilentz, C.J., concurring) (citing Brooks v. Pennsylvania Mfrs. Ass'n Ins., 121 N.J. Super. 51, 296 A.2d 72 (App. Div. 1972), modified on
other grounds, 62 N.J. 583, 303 A.2d 884 (1973)).
130 Perini, 129 N.J. at 524-27, 610 A.2d at 387-89 (Wilentz, C.J., concurring) (citations omitted). As the chiefjustice noted, most jurisdictions had refused to vacate an
award for reasons other than irrationality, fraud, corruption, or some similar wrongdoing. Id. at 527, 610 A.2d at 389 (Wilentz, C.J., concurring). The plurality's rule,
which would vacate an award for other reasons, including that of a "gross" legal error,
thus fell within a minority position. Id. at 527-28, 610 A.2d at 388-89 (Wilentz, C.J.,
concurring).
131 Id. at 527-36, 610 A.2d at 389-93 (Wilentz, C.J., concurring).
132 Id. at 527-29, 610 A.2d at 389 (Wilentz, C.J., concurring).
133 Id. at 529-30, 610 A-2d 389-90 (Wilentz, C.J., concurring) (citation omitted).
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the plurality had failed to define adequately what constituted a
gross error of law.'1 4 The chief justice envisioned the difficulties
that judges would experience in attempting to distinguish between
a "gross" legal error and any other error. 135 The concurrence also
noted that judges would encounter additional problems in determining whether any legal error had taken place in the arbitration
proceedings if no record, or only a limited record, of the arbitra36
tor's reasoning was available.'
Next, the chiefjustice discussed the potentially negative implications of the rule's implementation. 137 The concurrence warned
that the plurality's rule would not only deprive the parties of the
recognized benefits of arbitration, 3 but also deprive them of the
arbitrator's award altogether.139 Observing both the problem of
congestion in the courts and the viability of arbitration as a means
to remedy that problem, the chief justice suggested that the rule,
by interfering with the arbitration process, actually hindered the
effectiveness of arbitration as an alternative method of dispute resolution."4 Furthermore, the chief justice noted that by defining
the phrase "undue means" to encompass a mistake of law, the plu134 Id. at 530, 610 A.2d at 390 (Wilentz, C.J., concurring) (citing id, 129 N.J. at 51516, 610 A.2d at 382-83). A Texas Court of Appeals attempted to define a gross error of
law in Bailey & Williams v. Westfall. Bailey & Williams v. Westfall, 727 S.W.2d 86, 90
(Tex. Ct. App. 1987). In Bailey & Williams, the court held that a gross error of law
implied "bad faith or failure to exercise honest judgment." Id. (citation omitted).
The court further noted that a gross mistake resulted where the decision was arbitrary
or capricious. Id. (citation omitted). The court simultaneously insisted, however, that
where due consideration was given and an honest judgment was rendered, the award,
no matter how erroneous, was not arbitrary or capricious. Id. (citation omitted).
135 Perini,129 N.J. at 530-31, 610 A.2d at 390 (Wilentz, CJ., concurring). This difficulty was foreseen in Collingswood Hosiery Mills v. American Federation of Hosiery Workers,
where the appellate division declared that it was questionable whether the distinction
between a "clear" and an "unclear" error of law could be made practically. Collingswood Hosiery Mills v. American Fed'n of Hosiery Workers, 31 NJ. Super. 466, 471,
107 A.2d 43, 45 (App. Div. 1954).
136 Perini, 129 N.J. at 533-35, 610 A.2d at 391-93 (Wilentz, C.J., concurring); see also
O.R. Sec., Inc. v. Professional Planning Assocs., 857 F.2d 742, 747 (11th Cir. 1988)
(recognizing that in those instances where the arbitrators have chosen not to explain
their reasoning for the award, a showing of manifest disregard is "extremely difficult"). Among the disadvantages of providing a fully reasoned award is that the arbitrator may render an award that is outmoded or unsuitable to the particular situation
so as not to deviate from the governing law. HOENIGER, supra note 4, § 6.22, at 6-51.
For a general discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of providing reasons for
the award, see id., § 6.22, at 6-50 to -53.
137 Perini,129 N.J. at 536-38, 610 A.2d 393-94 (Wilentz, CJ., concurring).
138 Id. at 537-38, 610 A.2d at 393-94 (Wilentz, CJ., concurring). See supa note 3
(discussing the benefits of arbitration).
139 Perini, 129 N.J. at 537-38, 610 A.2d at 394 (Wilentz, CJ., concurring).
140 Id. at 539, 610 A.2d at 394-95 (Wilentz, C.J., concurring).
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rality had misinterpreted the phrase in a way that directly contradicted the legislature's intent.14 1 Chief Justice Wilentz explained
that, taken in context, the phrase referred only to a defect that
14 2
affected the integrity of the whole dispute resolution process.
Additionally, the concurrence pointed out that parties do not
always want their disputes resolved according to the law, but will
often rely on the arbitrator's expertise 14 and sense of fairness to

fashion an appropriate award.' 44 If the parties desire a different
standard, the chiefjustice offered, they may simply provide for one
in their agreement.' 4 5 Otherwise, the chief justice asserted, the
presumption, absent a contrary expression in the agreement,

should be that the parties expect the arbitrators to
use any stan46
dard that results in a just and equitable outcome.

Chief Justice Wilentz next commented on the difficulty in ascertaining both the precise bounds and the application of the plurality's rule.' 4 7 The chief justice derived from the plurality's rule
that the arbitrator's award would be subject to review similar to
that of an appellate court.148 As a result, the chief justice warned

that the standard for reversal would become one of mere error of
law. 14 9 The concurrence thus maintained that the court should
141 Id. at 540-41, 610 A.2d at 395 (Wilentz, C.J., concurring) (citing N.J. STAT. ANN.
§§ 2A:24-8 to -9 (West 1952)).
142 Id.
143 See Local No. 153, Office & Professional Employees Int'l Union v. Trust Co., 105
N.J. 442, 448, 522 A.2d 992, 995 (1987) (noting that one of the benefits of arbitration
is that arbitration provides for a decisionmaker who has experience in the particular
industry and knowledge of customs and practices of the work site) (citation omitted).
144 Perini, 129 N.J. at 543, 610 A.2d at 397 (Wilentz, C.J., concurring); see also
Motomura, supra note 38, at 3940 (articulating the expectation that both labor and
commercial arbitrators resolve their respective disputes according to usual business
practices with which they are familiar and not necessarily according to strict legal
principles).
145 Perini, 129 N.J. at 544, 610 A.2d at 397 (Wilentz, C.J., concurring).
146 Id. at 543, 610 A.2d at 396-97 (Wilentz, C.J., concurring). The chiefjustice based
this observation on the same passage of the construction industry arbitration rules
that the plurality cited, namely that the arbitrator "may grant any remedy or relief
which is just and equitable." Id. at 490-91, 610 A.2d at 369; see CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY
ARBrrRATION R 43 (as amended Jan. 1, 1986), reprinted in Appendix 9, DOMKE, supra
note 1, app. IX, at 65.
147 Perin4 129 N.J. at 544-48, 610 A.2d at 397-99 (citations omitted) (Wilentz, C.J.,
concurring). The chiefjustice cited four separate formulations furnished by the plurality: first, the presumption that parties intended the arbitrators to be bound by New
Jersey law, second, a gross legal error constituted grounds for vacating an award;
third, that no disregard of the law on the part of the arbitrator was necessary to vacate
an award; and fourth, the error need not be readily, if at all, apparent on the "face of
the record." Id. at 545, 610 A.2d at 398 (Wilentz, C.J., concurring).
148 Id. at 547, 610 A.2d at 399 (Wilentz, C.J., concurring).
149 Id. at 54748, 610 A.2d at 399 (Wilentz, C.J., concurring).
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consider only whether the award was "just and equitable." 5 ' Chief
Justice Wilentz concluded that, absent "fraud, corruption, or simi51
lar wrongdoing," the award should not have been vacated.1
Concurring in part and dissenting in part, Justice Stein agreed
152
with the plurality's standard for reviewing an arbitration award.
The justice disagreed, however, with the majority's decision to uphold the award in contravention of legal principles regarding delay
damages and substantial completion. 5 '
It is ironic that the plurality struggled with the legislature's
obscure phraseology of "undue means,"' 5 4 yet, in setting its own
standard of judicial review, failed to give meaning to such terms as
"gross,"' 55 "unmistakable," or "undebatable" errors and "manifest
disregard"'5 6 of the law.' 57 Further, the plurality's standard
presents a potential conflict with the general rule that arbitrators
150 Id.
151 Id.
152 Id.

at 548, 610 A.2d at 399 (Wilentz, C.J., concurring).

at 549, 610 A.2d at 399. (Stein, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
Justice Handler joined in this opinion. Id. Judges Andrew Stein and John Keefe,
appellate division judges, were temporarily assigned to hear this case in the absence of
Justices Garibaldi and Pollock. Id. at 556, 610 A.2d at 403.
153 Id. at 549-56, 610 A.2d at 400-03 (Stein, J., concurring in part, dissenting in
part).
154 See San Martine Compania De Navegacion, S.A. v. Saguenay Terminals Ltd., 293
F.2d 796, 801-02 (9th Cir. 1961) (noting that if the legislature had wanted "undue
means" to encompass a mistake of law, it would have so stated). The San Martine
court declared that Congress's enactment of the federal arbitration statute, which
provided for vacation or modification of an arbitration award, made clear that Congress was aware that an award would not be vacated for legal or factual error. Id.
Furthermore, the court emphasized that if Congress had intended a different rule, it
would have specifically drafted a separate subdivision so stating. Id.; see also Collingswood Hosiery Mills, Inc. v. American Fed'n of Hosiery Workers, 31 N.J. Super. 466,
469, 107 A.2d 43, 44 (App. Div. 1954) (proposing that reliance on the "undue means"
language as statutory support for a decision to vacate an award on the grounds of a
mistake of law "puts some strain on the words of that provision").
155 At one point, the Perinicourt referred to Held to clarify that a "gross" error was
one which suggested fraud or misconduct. Perini, 129 N.J. at 493, 610 A.2d at 370
(citation omitted). These components of fraud and misconduct are essential because
it is only by their inclusion that a more contextually accurate definition of the phrase
"undue means" may be fully achieved. See Perini, 129 N.J. at 542, 610 A.2d at 396
(Wilentz, C.J., concurring) (indicating that the "undue means" provision "has nothing to do with errors of law").
156 For definitional problems of the phrase "manifest disregard," see San Martine,
293 F.2d at 801 (stating that the Wilko v. Swan Court failed to define the phrase or
differentiate between a "manifest disregard" of the law and a mere erroneous interpretation of the law) (footnote omitted); Transit Casualty Co. v. Trenwick Reinsurance Co., 659 F. Supp. 1346, 1355 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (stating that an erroneous
application of the law was insufficient, yet acknowledging that a precise definition of
"manifest disregard of the law" was unavailable) (citation omitted), affd, 841 F.2d
1117 (2d Cir. 1988); I/S Stavborg v. National Metal Converters, Inc., 500 F.2d 424,
431 (2d Cir. 1974) (same) (citation omitted). But see Advest, Inc. v. McCarthy, 914
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do not have to state their reasons for the award. 158 In the absence
of articulated reasons, 159 a reviewing court cannot determine
whether an error is apparent on the face of the award, whether an
arbitrator "manifestly disregarded" the law, or whether an arbitrator intended to follow the law." 6 The Perinidecision thus indirectly
forces arbitrators to explain their reasons for the award so as to
16 1
enable the courts to review the awards for errors.
F.2d 6, 10 (1st Cir. 1990) (explaining that "there is nothing talismanic about the
phrase 'manifest disregard'") (citation omitted).
Explaining the difficulties with a "manifest disregard" standard, the Ninth Circuit
in San Martine stated that the standard mandates a "degree of error" test. San Martine,
293 F.2d at 801 n.4. Using this test, the San Martine court reasoned that the words
"manifest disregard" implied that the award would withstand vacation if it was not
"too far afield," but would be fatally flawed if it contained an egregious error. Id.
One unfortunate consequence, the court noted, would be that the results would differ from judge to judge. Id.
157 See Perini, 129 N.J. at 496, 610 A.2d at 372-73.
158 See, e.g., I/S Stavborg v. National Metal Converters, Inc., 500 F.2d 424, 429 (2d
Cir. 1974) (stating that "[iut seems rather anomalous, but had the arbitral majority
failed to render a written opinion in this case, our ability-ignoring the question of
our power-to review that decision would be greatly limited") (citation omitted). Further, the Michigan Supreme Court acknowledged that, among other factors, the absence of a verbatim record and formal findings of fact leave reviewing courts without
any basis upon which to find substantial legal error. Detroit Auto. Inter-Ins. Exch. v.
Gavin, 331 N.W.2d 418, 428 (Mich. 1982). See infra notes 160-61 (discussing the
problems that result when arbitrators fail to articulate reasons for their award).
159 See Siderius, Inc. v. M.V. "Ida Prima", 613 F. Supp. 916, 921 (S.D.N.Y. 1985)
(commenting on the reality that "[a]rbitrators' decisions are rarely explained.").
160 See, e.g., Sobel v. Hertz, Warner & Co., 469 F.2d 1211, 1214 (2d Cir. 1972). The
Sobel court, discussing the problems of applying a "manifest disregard" standard,
observed:
The problem is how a court is to be made aware of the erring conduct
of the arbitrators. Obviously, a requirement that arbitrators explain
their reasoning in every case would help to uncover egregious failures
to apply the law to an arbitrated dispute. But such a rule would undermine the very purpose of arbitration [.]...The sacrifice that arbitration
entails in terms of legal precision is recognized .. .[and] is implicitly
accepted in the initial assumption that certain disputes are arbitrable.... Given that acceptance, the primary consideration for the courts
must be that the system operate expeditiously as well as fairly.
Id. (citation omitted). In light of the foregoing, ChiefJustice Wilentz was absolutely
correct in stating that the focus of review should be on the parties' intent and not on
the intent of the arbitrators. Perini, 129 N.J. at 529-30, 610 A.2d at 389-90 (Wilentz,
C.J., concurring). Without having the reasons set forth on the award, it would be
impossible in the absence of any explanation for courts to decipher the arbitrators'
intent.
161 See, e.g., A.G.Edwards & Sons, Inc. v. McCollough, 967 F.2d 1401, 1403 (9th Cir.
1992) (asserting that where arbitrators fail to explain their awards, courts could vacate
an award in a situation where the award recipient had offered only one meritless
defense), cert. denied, 113 S.Ct. 970, reh'g denied, 113 S.Ct. 1666 (1993). The Ninth
Circuit recognized that in avoiding vacation on the grounds of a meritless defense,
"[p]anels of arbitrators wishing to avoid relitigation would be forced to state the rea-
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Additionally, the Perini court, adopting the standard used in
public sector arbitration, held that a private sector arbitration
award should be sustained so long as the arbitrator's determination
of a legal issue is reasonably debatable. 6 2 In so doing, however,
the plurality failed to state clearly whether its holding should be
strictly limited to commercial arbitration or whether it may be extended to arbitration proceedings in other arenas, such as family
law. 1 63 Lower courts, deciding whether to confirm an award, will
therefore have to determine whether to use the Perinistandard for
all cases or find the standard inapplicable to those cases arising
64
outside commercial law.'
What should the bounds of judicial interference be?' 6 5 The
answer lies in the very definition of arbitration, which clearly establishes arbitration as a different forum than the courts for resolving
disputes; 1 66 one that is, in fact, often at cross-purposes with the
court system. 16 7 Thus, arbitration should not be judged by court
sons for their decision in direct contradiction of the universally accepted rule that a
statement of reasons is not required and arbitrators are presumed to have relied on
permissible grounds." Id. (citation omitted).
162 Perini, 129 N.J. at 493, 610 A.2d at 371 (citation omitted).
163 Id. at 497, 610 A.2d at 373. The court, in commenting on the rarity of appeals,
referred only to commercial arbitration awards. Id. at 497, 610 A.2d at 373. In the
very next sentence, however, the court directly referred to a family law arbitration
award that was appealed. Id. (citing Faherty v. Faherty, 97 NJ. 99, 101, 477 A.2d 1257,
1259 (1984)).
164 If it is recognized that differences do exist between various arbitrations, and that
they do serve different needs, i.e., the object of a construction arbitration dispute is
very different from a divorce arbitration dispute in that the one is used for its quick
resolution and finality while the other must contemplate more seriously various public policy concerns, then the implementation of different standards ofjudicial review
over these various arbitrations should be considered. See Simpson, supra note 3, at 53
(noting that, among the recommendations submitted to improve the judicial arbitration program in NewJersey, was the suggestion that "different arbitration rules should
be tested to evaluate the relative merits of programs . . . constructed on different
rationales of arbitration").
165 Within the same case, differing opinions to the answer to this question have
been found. Compare Detroit Auto. Inter-Ins. Exch. v. Gavin, 331 N.W.2d 418, 437
(Mich. 1982) (Levin, J., concurring) (warning against judicial review of arbitral
awards because such review would encourage appellate proceedings and "make arbitration a less attractive alternative to litigation") with id. at 431 (noting that the judiciary has a fundamental duty "to assure that its equitable power is exercised in keeping
with the rule of law[,]" despite the notion of freedom of contract).
166 See HOENIGER, supra note 4, § 6.20, at 6-47 (stating that "modern judicial decisions recognize that, absent some express other agreement of the parties, arbitration

is a method of dispute resolution fundamentally different from litigation").
167 See id., § 1.06, at 1-7 (analyzing the differences between arbitration and litigation). Hoeniger stated:
[C] onsiderations of equity, justice, and commercial reasonableness may
well play a greater role in the [arbitration] outcome than they do in the
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rules or standards. It therefore seems appropriate to deny judicial
in the
review where the result is fair,'6 8 but still allow for review
169
occurred.
injustice
substantial
a
where
instance
limited
Whatever the judicial standard of review,1 7 ° however, the solution to the problem posed by Perini 7 remains, and perhaps must
courtroom. That is hardly a negative. Most business disputes are not
black and white. Rather, they involve varying shades of grey. The winlose, all-or-nothing approach epitomized by litigation is usually not the
ideal model for resolving commercial disputes, nor one that generally
conforms to the practice and expectations of most business people.
Id.; see also Robert Force & Anthony J. Mavronicolas, Two Models of Maritime Dispute
Resolution: Litigation and Arbitration, 65 TUL. L. REv. 1461, 1469-72 (1991) (discussing
the pros and cons of litigation and arbitration within the context of maritime
disputes).
168 The fairness standard should hold true, especially in those situations, as in Perin, where the agreement specifically provided that the arbitrators have the power to
decide on principles of equity and justice. See HOENIGER, supra note 4, § 6.20, at 6-47.
Hoeniger stated that § 43 of the American Association of Arbitration Rules "clearly
gives the arbitrators the power to render an award that is not based on strict law, but is
based in whole or in part on considerations of fairness, reasonableness, and equity."
Id. The Perini plurality only briefly alluded to the notion of fairness, mentioning but
once the parties' agreement to follow the Construction Rules of the AAA that allow an
arbitrator to render an award that is just and equitable. Perini, 129 N.J. at 490-91, 610
A.2d at 369. In so doing, the plurality failed to recognize that parties, in addition to
wanting the other benefits of arbitration, perhaps most importantly wish the result to
be fair andjust. See HOENIGER, supra note 4, § 6.20, at 6-47 (emphasizing that "a resolution that is broadly fair and equitable is the very result the parties contracted for
when they stipulated to arbitrate their disputes"); see also Simpson, supranote 3, at 54
(recognizing the limited attention paid to the litigants' perception of arbitration as
being a generally fair process).
169 See supra note 81 (outlining Justice Kennard's dissent to the majority's upholding an arbitrator's award in the face of a substantial injustice).
170 The Perinirule may be in some danger of modification or perhaps abolishment
in light of the New Jersey Supreme Court's recent review of In re Tretina Printing Inc.
v. Fitzpatrick Assocs. In re Tretina Printing, Inc. v. Fitzpatrick Assocs., 262 N.J. Super.
45, 619 A.2d 1037 (App. Div.), certif granted, 133 N.J. 442, 627 A.2d 1147 (1993). The
Tretina parties, unlike Perini, however, did not argue that mistakes of law were made
but rather that the arbitrators ignored the parties' contract, decided issues against the
weight of the evidence, and failed to rule on certain claims. Id. at 52-53, 619 A.2d at
1040. Further, the Tretina court, in observing that the arbitrator manifestly disregarded the "heart of the parties' contract," deviated somewhat from the Perinistandard
that looked to whether the arbitrator manifestly disregarded the law. See id. at 49, 619
A.2d at 1039; Perini, 129 N.J. at 496, 610 A.2d at 372-73. Because the issues in Tretina
are therefore not "on all fours" with those argued in Perini,and considering that Perini
has only recently been decided, it is unlikely that the New Jersey Supreme Court will
overrule Perini. See Source on file with the Seton Hall Law Review.
171 In numerous discussions with attorneys and others involved in arbitration generally, the consensus has been that the Perinidecision, in affirming what many considered an outrageous award, "sent a shudder" through the construction industry. See
Source on file with the Seton Hall Law Review. It is unknown at this early date what the
precise impact of the Tretina decision will be, but it is clear that those who had earlier
embraced arbitration are now more reluctant to do so. Id.
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initiate from within the AAA itself.1 7 2 The AAA, at the very minimum, must continue to revise and develop its procedures to protect the parties against arbitrator/arbitration abuses not clearly
articulated in the arbitration statute.1 7 3 Thus, arbitration would
continue to remain "one of the noblest designs ever painted by
174
hand or mind of man on the canvas of life."
Cheiyl Aptowitzer

172 There are some, however, who would resist this change because of a legitimate
sense of the inevitability of mistakes in any forum. See, e.g., Edgar H. Brenner, Comments at American Bar Association conference on Critical Issues in Arbitration (Nov.
5, 1993) (Text of speech on file with the Seton Hall Law Review) (concluding that the
etymological similarities between the word "arbitrator" and "arbitrary" as used within
the court system brings about "[a] degree of imperfection in the arbitration process
[that] must be accepted in rare instances if arbitration is to achieve its purpose in most
cases"). Instead, Brenner proposed twelve alternative ways that the parties could reduce the chance of irrational awards and judicial involvement in the arbitration process, e.g., careful drafting of dispute clauses. Id.; see also Steen, supra note 123, at 742,
760 (articulating the need for careful drafting). But see Editorial, Arbitration at the
Crossroads, 133 N.J. L.J. 274 (Jan. 25, 1993) (seeking relief from the legislature to
revise the Arbitration Act so as to eliminate judicial review of arbitration awards).
173 See AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, JUDICIAL REFERENCE PROCEDURES, at 2
(Jan. 1990) (allowing parties who provide forJudicial Reference to have their disputes
settled by a panel of attorneys or retired judges rather than lay arbitrators). The AAA
has already taken some steps to establish supplemental procedures for more difficult
cases. See AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, SUPPLEMENTARY PROCEDURES FOR
LARGE, COMPLEX DIsPuTES at 9, 11 (Mar. 1993) (routing complicated cases to select
arbitrators who have the necessary technical and legal expertise); AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, GUIDELINES FOR EXPEDITING LARGER, COMPLEX CONSTRUCTION ARBITRATIONS (Dec. 1990) (same).

174 Gotshal, supra note 1, at 553.

